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The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the establishment of an Information 
Operations (IO) command and will stimulate further discussion and research of this issue.  
Concepts and definitions of Information Operations are presented to provide the reader a 
common framework of understanding upon which to base further discussion of IO. 
Current organizational structure, doctrine for execution of IO, and how IO supports 
national and military objectives are also presented and shortcomings examined. After 
consideration of several possible solutions a proposed structure for and  IO command is 
presented and the feasibility of that structure discussed. 
B. BACKGROUND 
There have been three significant “waves” in civilization to date.  The first wave, 
known as the Agrarian Age, took place during the first several thousand years of 
civilization.  This was a period of hunting and gathering that eventually progressed into 
the establishment of farms and towns.  The Second Wave, known as the Industrial Age, 
dates back to the end of the 18th century, introducing steam power, machinery, factories, 
and mass production which gradually began to replace the sprawling farmlands and 
agricultural areas.  The Third Wave, described as the Information Age, started with the 
space race between the United States and the former Soviet Union in the 1950’s.1  Today, 
much as industry replaced agriculture as the driving economic and social force in the 
Second Wave, information is gradually edging out industry as the economic and societal 
prime mover.  The coming of the information age is very different than the coming of the 
industrial age—whereas in the industrial age a significant amount of capital investment 
over a relatively long period of time was required to make great advances, it is entirely 
possible that non-industrialized nations without vast quantities of investment capital can 
achieve a quantum leap forward in a short amount of time.  The potential for such a 
quantum leap in military capabilities or the dawning of an entirely new concept of 
warfare—a Revolution in Military Affairs—has garnered much attention and speculation. 
                                                 
1 Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-war: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century (New York: 
Little, Brown, and Company, 1993) 9. 
2 
The concept that warfare’s very nature has been transformed throughout history 
by new ideas and the introduction of technology is the basis of the Revolution in Military 
Affairs (RMA) concept.  This idea was first postulated by Michael Roberts in 1956.2  He 
described four measures that marked revolutionary change in warfare as a result of the 
adoption of massed volley fire by the Swedes in the sixteenth and seventeenth century 
including a radically differing military organization, radical shift in the size of forces, 
radical new doctrine and/or strategy, and a social impact.3  The term ‘Military 
Revolution’ has evolved into ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ and may be defined as: 
A major change in the nature of warfare brought about by 
the innovative application of new technologies which 
combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and 
operational and organizational concepts, fundamentally 
alters the nature and the conduct of war.4 
Or: 
What occurs when the application of new technologies into 
a significant number of military systems combines with 
innovative operational concepts and organizational 
adaptation in a way that fundamentally alters the character 
and conduct of conflict.  It does so by producing a dramatic 
increase—often an order of magnitude or greater—in the 
combat potential and military effectiveness of armed 
forces.5 
Strategic analysts and military historians have identified key changes in the 
development of warfare that could be considered RMAs. While there is a certain amount 
of variation in these lists, reflecting debates over which changes were truly significant 
enough to be considered “revolutionary” rather than merely “evolutionary”, some 
frequently cited examples of previous RMAs include the introduction of mass armies by 
Napoleon during the French Revolution, the development of blitzkrieg warfare by the 
Germans in World War II, and the introduction of nuclear weapons to warfare. 
                                                 
2 John Arquilla, “The ‘Velvet’ Revolution in Military Affairs.” World Policy Journal Winter 
1997/1998): 35. 
3 Michael Roberts, Essays in Swedish History (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1967). 
 4 Michael Mazaar, et al., The Military Technical Revolution: A Structural Framework (Carlisle 
Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College) 21.  Definition offered by Andrew Marshall, former 
Director of the Office of Net Assessment. 
5  Andrew Krepinevich, “Cavalry to Computer:  The Pattern of Military Revolutions,” The National 
Interest Fall 1994: 30. 
3 
Rapid advances in information and communications technology have generated 
much discussion of the possible emergence of another RMA.  The idea that the world, 
and the United States in particular, is on the cusp of the next Revolution in Military 
Affairs is one that has spurred heated debate and literary wrangling.  Regardless of the 
preferred school of thought, it remains clear that technology is advancing and is 
powerful—yet technology alone is not a guarantor of victory. 
Information has never been more powerful.  In the information age, adversaries 
have refined the stagecraft of altering perceptions and attacking the will of the American 
public in order to affect American foreign policy and exploit a susceptible American 
media to state their case to the general public into a fine art.  They actively and 
effectively use the power of the press to sway world opinion.  And the media gladly 
obliges—after all, information is a driving economic force.  The advent of the 
information age has given new meaning to Shakespeare’s “the world is but a stage.”   
The world watched as the United States displayed overwhelming military force 
against Iraq in Desert Storm.  The world watched, and the world learned.  The world 
learned that going against the United States in a traditional force-on-force battle would 
turn out to be another live-fire exercise for U.S. armed forces.  In Somalia, they watched 
low-tech insurgents wage information warfare against the United States and win.  A 
vicious firefight between elite U.S. Army Rangers and Delta Force against the followers 
of Somali warlords ended with 18 Americans killed.  The media aired films of the 
mutilated bodies of American soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu.  
U.S. public outcry precipitated the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Somalia.  Effectively 
wielded information—a short video clip—did in three days what military force could not 
accomplish.  Our adversaries watched, and our adversaries learned.   
No adversary can match the United States on the conventional military scale; 
however, information technologies are easily obtained and inexpensive.  Attacks via 
information systems are hard to track, the perpetrators are not easily identified, and the 
attack may be successful and remain completely undetected.  The realm of technology 
and information is an area where our adversaries find themselves on a somewhat more 
equal footing.   
4 
The United States holds a technological advantage, but the information sword cuts 
both ways—it will be difficult, perhaps impossible, to stop or control the acquisition of 
advanced technologies by our adversaries.  There is no guarantee that our current 
technological advantage will remain.  The answer to the threat is Information Operations, 
employing traditional concepts in new ways with emerging technology.  The question is 
how to best make it work? 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
Is there a need for an Information Operations organization at the joint military-
strategic (unified command) level to integrate, coordinate, deconflict, and synchronize 
information activities within the Department of Defense? 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions  
What is IO? 
How does IO support National Objectives? 
What is the problem with current IO doctrine? 
What is the feasibility of creating the proposed IO organization? 
How should the Information Operations organization be structured? 
D. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I identifies the purpose of the thesis, provides background information, 
and establishes the thesis objectives. 
Chapter II discusses and defines Information Operations. 
Chapter III discusses how Information Operations support national and military 
objectives. 
Chapter IV discusses organizations that support Information Operations. 
Chapter V points out the major problem with the concept of IO in support of 
national and military objectives, joint IO doctrine, and current IO support structure. 
Possible solutions to the problem are explored. 
Chapter VI provides a conclusion and possible areas of future research. 
5 
Appendix A contains a list of common acronyms relating to Information 
Operations. 
Appendix B provides joint definitions for IO and related components. 
Appendix C presents a broad overview of the National Military Structure. 
Appendix D describes the composition of a typical IO cell. 
Appendix E is a white paper on Presidential Decision Directive 56, Managing 
Complex Contingency Operations. 
Appendix F is a white paper on Presidential Decision Directive 63, Critical 
Infrastructure Protection. 
Appendix G is an unclassified synopsis of Presidential Decision Directive 68, 
International Public Information. 
Appendix H contains the text of the Executive Order on Critical Infrastructure 
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II. DEFINING INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
 A growing asymmetric threat from adversaries coupled with constant 
advancements in information technology gives pause to those who once thought the awe-
inspiring conventional power of the United States would always be sufficient to ensure 
our safety and security.  Learning the lessons driven home by the world press after U.S. 
involvement in Iraq and Somalia, our adversaries are turning to technology in an effort to 
make the quantum leap from third world power to world power broker.  The United 
States, too, looks to information technology as a solution to the problem it is creating.  
The ideas behind Information Operations (IO) hold the potential to provide the United 
States a stronger grip on and perhaps widen the margin of our current strategic advantage.   
In order to achieve a meaningful discussion of IO, it is necessary to establish a 
common framework of concepts and terminology.  General concepts of IO and 
explanations of terminology are provided in this chapter. 
A. LOVE, HATE, AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
The term “Information Operations” provokes strong reactions, paralleling the 
reception given to the concept of airpower in the first half of the 20th century.  On one 
hand, extreme proponents of IO preach of the solution to all current problems, 
foreseeable issues, and future trials and tribulations.  At the other end of the spectrum are 
those who view IO as little more than the latest buzzword coined to describe trendy 
technology, presently in vogue because of the funding available for IO-related projects.  
The intense response may be due to the fact that some early proponents of IO lost 
credibility, as did early proponents of airpower, by claiming operational benefits far 
beyond what was technically possible at the time.  Enthusiasts of IO championed the idea 
as a new, truly unique form of warfare, or an RMA (a statement sure to provoke intense 
response by itself).  They forecast dominant battlespace awareness, where wars would be 
fought and won exclusively in the electronic domain with virtual combat staffs zapping 
information across networks.6  In the 1920s, airpower visionaries touted capabilities that 
                                                 
6 Carla Bass, Building Castles on Sand? Ignoring the Riptide of Information Operations, Maxwell 
Papers, no. 15 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, August 1998) 4. 
8 
would not come to pass until near the end of World War II.  Strategists working in the 
Air War Plans Division in August 1941 overestimated the capabilities of strategic 
airpower, postulating that bombers alone would win air superiority while pursuit aircraft, 
lacking the range to accompany the bombers, would take up a defensive role and protect 
bases.  The Eighth Air Force subsequently sent large groups of unescorted bombers deep 
into Germany.7  This strategy was disastrous until technology caught up to strategy.  
Airpower strategists in Desert Storm attempted to oversell airpower, claiming that 
airpower could win the war by executing 700 daily strikes against Iraq for six consecutive 
days.  The planners lost credibility when they made no allowances to attack ground 
forces and could not answer the question, “What happens after day six?”8 
 Strategists find themselves facing the proverbial chicken and egg argument; are 
strategies developed based on technology or are technologies developed to enable 
strategies?  Further discussion of this question and deeper development of the RMA 
question is beyond the scope of this thesis; however, it is important to consider those 
issues when forming a conceptual framework of Information Operations. 
B. CONCEPTS OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS  
 All too often IO is mistakenly and exclusively associated with information 
warfare, computer warfare, or computer network operations (discussed later in this 
chapter).  This misconception seriously undermines our ability to conduct effective IO 
and hampers any effort to develop successful offensive and counter IO strategies. 
Balancing the efforts of both technology (information management) and the human 
aspects (information manipulation) is critical to the success of IO.  
1. A Historical Perspective on IO 
History provides an excellent case to further illustrate the point that IO is not 
simply computer-related when examining U.S. Civil War General William Tecumseh 
Sherman’s infamous “March to the Sea” in 1864.  This campaign demonstrates that IO 
                                                 
7 Robert Frank Futrell, “AWPD-1: Air Planning for War,” in Air War College Strategy, Doctrine, and 
Air Power, Book II (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, August 1997)93-97. 
8 Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, “Instant Thunder,” in Air War College Strategy, Doctrine, and 
Air Power, Book II (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, August 1997) 447-73. 
9 
played a significant role in military operations long before the full exploitation of the 
electronic spectrum by military and communications technology.   
In the late summer of 1864 there was still hope of victory in the South and the 
desire to continue the fight against the Union. Southern leaders urged continued 
resistance and considered some type of negotiated settlement favorable to the 
Confederacy.  The desire to resist remained strong in many parts of the South that had not 
yet been directly affected by combat operations.9  To combat this entrenched Southern 
will, Sherman recognized the need to directly assault the will of the Confederacy. “If the 
people raise a howl against my barbarity and cruelty, I will answer that war is war, and 
not popularity seeking. If they want peace, they and their relatives must stop the war.”10 
Sherman planned to march between Macon and Augusta toward Savannah to link 
there with the Union Navy.  He would “…forage liberally on the country during the 
march,”11 destroy rail lines, and capture or destroy remaining military assets of the 
Confederacy. His ultimate goal was to deny the resources to continue further resistance 
not only to the Confederate military, but also to the civilian populace.12 
Sherman operated in a typical information environment for his time. During his 
march to the sea, Sherman relied on the telegraph to contact General Grant, his 
commander. The electric telegraph had been in use throughout the country since the 
1840s with access available in many medium-sized towns.13  As long as these lines were 
maintained, command and control was significantly enhanced. Eventually, portable 
telegraph systems, transported by wagon, were emplaced to gain access to wire 
communications at forward tactical field locations.14  Most of Sherman’s messages to his 
subordinate units were handwritten and sent by courier, however.  Newspapers played an 
important role in keeping the local population informed of the current situation. In some 
                                                 
9 Ricky Nussio, Sherman and Nimitz: Executing Modern Information Operations (Fort Leavenworth, 
KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2001) 10. 
10 William T. Sherman, Memoirs of General William Tecumseh Sherman, ed. Charles Royster (New 
York: The Literary Classics of the United States of America, 1990) 585. 
11 Ibid, 711. 
12 Nussio, 11. 
13 Archer Jones, Civil War Command and Strategy: The Process of Victory and Defeat (New York: 
The Free Press, 1992) 39. 
10 
cases, the Confederates tried to organize resistance to Sherman’s army by newspaper.15  
Additionally, railroads served as vital lines of communications for both the Union and the 
Confederacy. Telegraph lines often followed railroads. The rail junctions tended to be 
urban centers that also served as logistics bases or industrial production facilities.  Most 
of the major operations of the war were directed along rail lines or toward major rail 
junctions. The armies of both sides not only depended on the railroads for their supplies, 
but also sought to deny use of the rail line to their enemies.   It was along these rail lines 
of communications that Sherman planned his march to the sea.16  
The march to the sea was designed to achieve information superiority, 
demonstrated at the operational level by the capture of Savannah, which prevented 
Confederate use of a key rail and sea communications junction while simultaneously 
providing him the use of those same resources.  He employed deception to engage limited 
Southern resources by bypassing the larger cities of Macon and Augusta.  The 
Confederates placed scarce military resources in these cities in preparation for an attack 
that never came.  The allocation of military resources by the Confederates in preparation 
for what they expected Sherman to do not only diverted resources that could have been 
better employed elsewhere but also resulted in Sherman having a nearly unopposed 
march to Savannah.17  The physical destruction Sherman caused to the Confederate 
infrastructure greatly impaired the ability of the South to further support the war effort 
but the greatest damage Sherman caused was to the minds of the Southern people.  
Essentially, Sherman brought the vulgarities of the war into the very homes of the people.  
The destruction and devastation he left in his wake was intended to impress upon the 
population the futility of the war effort and that continued resistance would exact a price 
greater than the South was willing to, or could, pay.18  The ultimate success of the march 
to the sea was that neither the Confederate military leadership nor civilian population 
                                                 
14 Paddy Griffith, Battle in the Civil War (Surrey: Field Books, 1986) 10. 
15 Sherman copied examples in his memoirs of orders from Southern leaders published in newspapers. 
Sherman, 665-666. 
16 Nussio, 11. 
17 Ibid, 14. 
18 Ibid, 16. 
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supported further resistance.  By attacking the popular will at its foundation, Sherman 
effectively defeated the Confederate armies.19 
2. Information 
A significant amount of confusion exists because of failure to distinguish between 
information, or data, the systems that carry that information, and the concepts of 
information operations.  The traditional role of information in conflict has been to 
provide the commander with a picture of the battlefield; knowing where your own troops 
are and precisely the location of enemy troops is priceless.  Much of the advances in 
technology have been applied towards the goal of enhancing the aforementioned 
battlefield picture development process.  However, enhanced awareness alone is not IO. 
Information, as defined by Merriam-Webster, is a signal or character (as in a 
communication system or computer) representing data.20  An outstanding perspective on 
information is provided by George Stein, stating that information is merely a means to a 
desired endstate: 
Information is itself a key aspect of national power and 
more importantly, is becoming an increasingly vital 
national resource that supports diplomacy, economic 
competition, and the effective employment of military 
forces.21 
3. Information Warfare and Information Operations 
Information warfare, in its essence, is about ideas and 
epistemology- big words meaning that information warfare 
is about the way humans think and, more important, the 
way humans make decisions. And although information 
warfare would be waged largely, but not entirely, through 
the communication nets of a society or its military, it is 
fundamentally not about satellites, wires, and computers. It 
is about influencing human beings and the decisions they 
make.22 
                                                 
19 B.H. Liddel Hart, Sherman (New York: Da Capo Press, 1993) 429-430. 
20 Merriam-Webster Online, 5 March 2002, <http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary>. 




Information Warfare (IW) was the word-of-the-day prior to the coining of 
Information Operations.  The fundamentals of IW—attacking and opponent’s information 
while protecting your own information—have not changed through time.  The principles 
of Sun Tzu, a Chinese general and military thinker dating to 500 B.C., are generously 
laden with references to espionage, rumors, deception, and operational security.  Sun Tzu 
regarded information as essential to success in any endeavor of war.  He advocated 
waging a war of perception manipulation and management with the target being the mind 
of the adversary (wet-ware). Deducing enemy plans, strengths and weaknesses, 
disrupting alliances, and attacking the strategy of the adversary was the strategy of Sun 
Tzu; “Those skilled in war subdue the enemy’s army without battle.  They capture his 
cities without assaulting them and overthrow his state without protracted operations.”23 
Information Operations and Information Warfare are terms that can be used 
nearly interchangeably:  The single difference is that IO comprises “actions taken to 
affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own 
information and information systems,”24 while IW is “IO conducted during time of crisis 
or conflict to achieve or promote a specific objective over a specific adversary or 
adversaries.”25  IO is conducted across the spectrum of operations from peace to war and 
IW is only conducted during conflict operations (see Figure 1). 
                                                 
23 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, ed. and trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1971) 79. 
24 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations 
(Washington, DC: GPO 1998) I-9. 




Figure 1.   IO across the Spectrum of Conflict. (From: Joint Pub 3-13, Joint Doctrine for 
Information Operations) 
 
The principles of IO—information manipulation—have not significantly changed 
over time and that technology—information management—is being integrated into the 
practice of IO.  Essentially, IO is the fusion of information manipulation with information 
management, a blending of art and science. 
a. Information Operations: Art 
The art component of IO focuses on the manipulation of the decision 
making process of the adversary.  The goal is to cause the adversary to act in a manner 
that supports our own objectives.  This manipulation is accomplished through the use of 
public affairs (PA), civil affairs (CA), and psychological operations (PSYOP). 
b. Information Operations: Science 
The science component of IO looks to the information systems and 
information processes of the adversary, disrupting, disabling, or destroying those systems 
and processes (while simultaneously protecting our own information systems and 
information processes) in order to remove his means to react—a technology induced 
paralysis.  It involves the use of technology in the form of computer network operations 
(CNO), electronic warfare (EW), and precision weapons (for destruction). 
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C. THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS 
How does the decision making process work?  The concept of the “OODA Loop” 





Figure 2.   The OODA Loop. (From: http://www.au.af.mil) 
 
1. Observe 
The first step of the decision making process is observation.  Observation refers to 
the necessity of becoming aware, especially through paying close attention.  The 
decision–maker must observe what is taking place and determine the circumstances under 
which he or she must function.  During this step data inputs pertaining to the situation are 
collected for analysis.  
2. Orient 
After data inputs on the situation are collected, it must be synthesized into 
information.  Collected data is merged with the observer’s existing mental framework 
where it is incorporated and shaped by unique personal characteristics such as genetics, 
culture, the surrounding environment, experience, and other information to form a mental 
image.  This mental image serves as the foundation upon which the decision will occur. 
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3. Decide  
In this step, the decision maker weighs the information acquired during the first 
half of the cycle with his objectives, considers the possible options and chooses which he 
will pursue. 
4. Act 
The last step in the cycle is action.  The decision maker implements his selected 
course of action, observes the results of that action, and the process begins again.  The 
length of time needed to cycle from observation to action is represented by the OODA 
loop’s diameter: A shorter amount of time to move from observation through to action is 
depicted as a smaller loop; a longer time as a larger one. 
5. Targeting the OODA Loop 
IO targets the first half of the decision making process as well as the size of the 
loop.  The decision maker’s observations can be changed through deception or through 
the disabling or disruption of information systems.  The possibilities are mind-boggling: 
misleading troop movements or faked messages (meant to be intercepted) providing 
misinformation regarding plans; shutting down the decision maker’s air warning radar by 
insertion of a computer virus in the system software, or better yet, leaving his radar 
system operational without any indication of malfunction and causing no contacts to 
show up (or false contacts approaching from another direction) while aircraft are inbound 
on a strike.  IO can use information that may not be true or accurate.  The information 
simply has to be believable, or even possible, to have an effect.  This is best demonstrated 
by the question “How many mines does it take to have a minefield?”  The answer is 
none—you only need to have people think that there are mines. 
Targeting the size of the OODA loop can involve purposeful dissemination or 
leaking of inaccurate information in order to cause a longer decision making process.  
Actions such as jamming the decision maker’s communication nets can not only slow the 
decision making process (each situation requires a certain level of information in order to 
make a decision) but when a decision is reached there would be no way to cause that 
decision to be implemented—you can not expect someone to execute orders they never 
received. 
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D. MILITARY PERSPECTIVE ON INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
Joint Publication 3-13 (Joint Doctrine for Information Operations) hereafter 
referred to as JP 3-13, was published in August, 1998.  It serves as the overarching 
direction for IO in the U.S. military.26  These “official” definitions, when merged with a 
basic understanding of the concepts of IO will complete the necessary foundation for the 
discussion of IO. 
Information warfare is information operations conducted during time of 
crisis or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or 
adversaries.27 
Information operations are actions taken to affect adversary information 
and information systems, while defending one’s own information and information 
systems. IO require the close, continuous integration of offensive and defensive 
capabilities and activities, as well as effective design, integration, and interaction of C2 
with intelligence support.  IO are conducted through the integration of many capabilities 
and related activities.  Major capabilities to conduct IO include, but are not limited to, 
OPSEC, PSYOP, military deception, EW, and physical attack/destruction, and could 
include CNA.  IO-related activities include, but are not limited to, public affairs (PA) and 
civil affairs (CA) activities. There are two major subdivisions within IO: offensive IO and 
defensive IO.28 
a. Offensive IO.  
Offensive IO involves the integrated use of assigned and supporting 
capabilities and activities, mutually supported by intelligence, to affect adversary 
decision makers and achieve or promote specific objectives.  Offensive IO involves 
OPSEC, military deception, PSYOP, Public Affairs (PA), Civil Affairs (CA), EW, 
physical attack/destruction, and Computer Network Attack.29 
                                                 
26 Ibid, i. 
27 Ibid, I-11. 
28 Ibid, I-9. 
29 Ibid, I-9. 
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b. Defensive IO.  
Defensive IO integrates and coordinates policies and procedures, 
operations, personnel, and technology to protect and defend information and information 
systems.  Defensive IO are conducted and assisted through information assurance (IA), 
OPSEC, physical security, counter-deception, Public Affairs (PA), counterintelligence 
(CI), EW, and CND.  Defensive IO ensures timely, accurate, and relevant information 
access while denying adversaries the opportunity to exploit friendly information and 
information systems for their own purposes.30 
c. Components of IO.  
Operational Security (OPSEC) contributes to offensive IO by slowing 
the adversary’s decision cycle and providing opportunity for easier and quicker 
attainment of friendly objectives. OPSEC focuses on having a good understanding of the 
adversary decision maker’s ability to collect reliable, adequate, and timely intelligence, 
and, when integrated with other capabilities, shapes to our advantage the adversary’s 
knowledge and beliefs about our operations.  OPSEC denies the adversary critical 
information about friendly capabilities and intentions needed for effective and timely 
decision making, leaving the adversary vulnerable to other offensive capabilities.31 
Information Assurance is defined as IO that protect and defend 
information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This includes providing for restoration of 
information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities.32 
Deception targets adversary decision makers through effects on their 
intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination systems.  Particular attention is placed 
on defining how we would like the enemy to act at critical points in the battle.  Those 
desired enemy actions then become the goal of deception operations.  Military deception 
is focused on desired behavior, not simply to mislead thinking.  The purpose is to cause 
adversary commanders to form inaccurate impressions about friendly force capabilities or 
                                                 
30 Ibid, I-9. 
31 Ibid, II-3. 
32 Ibid, III-4. 
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intentions, misappropriate their intelligence collection assets, or fail to employ combat or 
support units to their best advantage.33 
Counter-deception is any efforts to negate, neutralize, diminish the 
effects of, or gain advantage from, a foreign deception operation.  Counter-deception 
does not include the intelligence function of identifying foreign deception operations.34 
Psychological Operations (PSYOP) are actions to convey selected 
information and indicators to foreign audiences.  They are designed to influence 
emotions, motives, reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, 
organizations, groups, and individuals.35 
Perception Management is action taken to convey and/or deny selected 
information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and 
objective reasoning; and to intelligence systems and leaders at all levels to influence 
official estimates, ultimately resulting in foreign behaviors and official actions favorable 
to the originator’s objectives. In various ways, perception management combines truth 
projection, operations security, cover and deception, and psychological operations.36 
Public Affairs (PA) activities expedite the flow of accurate and timely 
information to internal (own organization) and external (the public) audiences, create an 
awareness of the military goals during a campaign or operation, satisfy the desires of the 
internal and external audiences to be kept informed about the campaign or operation, and 
inform internal and external audiences of significant developments affecting them.  PA 
activities will not be used as a military deception capability or to provide disinformation 
to either internal or external audiences.37 
Civil Affairs (CA) encompass activities that establish and maintain 
relationships between military forces and the civil authorities and general populations, 
resources, and institutions in friendly, neutral, or hostile areas where their forces are 
                                                 
33 Ibid, II-3. 
34 Ibid, GL-9. 
35 Ibid, II-4 
36 Ibid, GL-9. 
37 Ibid, II-6. 
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employed.  These activities may occur before, during, subsequent to, or in the absence of 
other military actions.  CA activities improve relations with friendly foreign military 
forces and civilian populations and regional strategy and long-term goals by 
strengthening the capabilities of a host nation in effectively applying its indigenous 
resources to mitigate or resolve its instability, privation, or unrest.38 
Electronic Warfare (EW) The three major subdivisions of EW are 
electronic attack (EA), electronic protection (EP), and electronic warfare support (ES). 
All three contribute to both offensive and defensive IO.  EW is any military action 
involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic 
spectrum or to attack the enemy.  EA involves actions taken to attack the adversary with 
the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying adversary combat capability to prevent 
or reduce an adversary’s effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum. EP involves such 
actions as self-protection jamming and emission control taken to protect friendly use of 
the electronic spectrum by minimizing the effects of friendly or adversary employment of 
EW that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability. ES contributes to 
situational awareness by detecting, identifying, and locating sources of intentional or 
unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat 
recognition.39 
Physical Attack/Destruction refers to the use of “hard kill” weapons 
against designated targets as an element of an integrated IO effort.40 
Physical Security is that part of security concerned with physical 
measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, 
installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, 
sabotage, damage, and theft.41 
Counterintelligence is information gathered and activities conducted to 
protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations 
                                                 
38 Ibid, II-6. 
39 Ibid, II-5. 
40 Ibid, II-5. 
41 Ibid, GL-9. 
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conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign 
organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities.42 
Computer Network Attack (CNA) is operations to disrupt, deny, 
degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the 
computers and networks themselves, executing the attack by data stream.43 
Computer Network Defense (CND) is the employment of defensive 
measures to protect and defend information, computers, and networks from disruption, 
denial, degradation, or destruction.44  
d. Related IO Definitions 
Information is defined as facts, data, or instructions in any medium or 
form. It is the meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known conventions 
used in their representation.  The same information may convey different messages to 
different recipients and thereby provide “mixed signals” to information gatherers and 
users, to include the intelligence community.45 
Information-based processes are processes that collect, analyze, and 
disseminate information using any medium or form.  These processes may be stand-alone 
processes or sub-processes which, taken together, comprise a larger system or systems of 
processes. Information-based processes may be found in any facet of military operations 
from combat through combat support and combat service support across the range of 
military operations, and in other elements of national power.  Information-based 
processes are included in all systems and components thereof that require facts, data, or 
instructions in any medium or form to perform designated functions or provide 
anticipated services.46 
                                                 
42 Ibid, GL-5. 
43 Ibid, GL-5. 
44 Department of Defense Dictionary, 9 March 2002, <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict>. 
45 JP 3-13, I-9. 
46 Ibid, I-9. 
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The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, 
organizations, or systems that collect, process, or disseminate information, including the 
information itself.47 
Information superiority is the capability to collect, process, and 
disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an 
adversary’s ability to do the same.48 
An information system is the entire infrastructure, organization, 
personnel, and components that collect, process, store, transmit, display, disseminate, and 






Figure 3.   Components of Information Operations. (From: Joint Warfare Center, Joint Task 
Force Information Operations Handbook) 
                                                 
47 Ibid, I-9. 
48 Ibid, I-10. 
49 Ibid, I-11. 
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E. SUMMARY 
The target of information warfare, then, is the human mind, 
especially those minds that make the key decisions of war 
or peace and, from the military perspective, those minds 
that make the key decisions on if, when, and how to 
employ the assets and capabilities embedded in their 
strategic structures. Cyberspace may be the new 
“battlespace,” but the battle remains the battle for the mind. 
There must be no confusion of the battlespace with the 
battle.50 
While Information Operations encompass a wide realm of disciplines (see Figure 
3) they do not include efforts at digitization of the battlefield and such concepts as 
Network Centric Warfare51 or efforts to improve existing command and control systems.  
Those efforts primarily focus on better enabling the current way of doing business rather 
than seek to develop new business practices.  It may be tempting to lump every system or 
idea containing “technology” or “information” under wide the umbrella of IO; but, if 



















                                                  
50 Stein, 5 March 2002. 
51 Network-Centric Warfare is defined as an information superiority-enabled concept of operations 
that generates increased combat power by networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters to achieve 
shared awareness, increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, and greater lethality.  For 
more information visit http://www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles98/PROcebrowski.htm 
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III. SUPPORTING NATIONAL OBJECTIVES 
A. DETERMINING NATIONAL OBJECTIVES 
The National Security Strategy (NSS) is the guiding document for the US grand 
strategy52 and supporting goals and objectives as defined by the President.  The President 
finds his guidance in the Preamble of the US Constitution: “…provide for the common 
defense, promote the General Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves 
and our Posterity…”53 The NSS provides guidance on how to employ the national 
instruments of power (diplomatic, economic, military, information)54 to achieve stated 
national goals and objectives.55   
As the national leadership generates national objectives and 
a nations security strategy to pursue them, the leadership 
will also devise—or modify—the military instrument of 
national power as a component of national security 
strategy.  This strategy takes the form of objectives for the 
development of broad military capabilities, their worldwide 
posture, and their functional and geographic orientation.  In 
the event of armed conflict, this strategy will take the form 
of military objectives for the establishment of military 
conditions essential to support national security objectives 
and terminate the conflict on terms favorable to US interest.  
These objectives need to be coordinated with associated 
diplomatic, economic, and informational objectives.56 
Currently the US employs a national strategy of engagement to shape the 
international environment and respond to the full spectrum of existing threats, while 
preparing now to meet the potential threats that tomorrow may bring.57 
                                                 
52 The art and science of developing and using the diplomatic, economic, and informational powers of 
a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war to secure national objectives. (Department of 
Defense Dictionary, 9 March 2002, < http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/n/03521.html>) 
53 US Congress, The Constitution of the United States (Washington, DC: GPO, 1997) 1. 
54 This chapter focuses on the application of the military instrument of power (IOP); specifically the 
use of the information IOP at the military level.  The use of  the information IOP at the national level would 
include the application of government, military, and civil capabilities and is outside the scope of this thesis; 
however, is an area that merits further research. 
55 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 0-2,Unified Action Armed Forces (Washington, DC: GPO 
2001) I-2.    
56 Ibid, I-2. 
 57 The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, DC: GPO, 1999) 
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B. DETERMINING MILITARY OBJECTIVES 
1. National Military Strategy 
The National Military Strategy (NMS) is developed by the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in accordance with the guidance contained in the National 
Security Strategy.  The NMS details how the military capabilities of the US Armed 
Forces are to be used to support the goals and objectives listed in the NSS.  The National 
Military Strategy defines national military objectives.  The national military objectives 
are “to Promote Peace and Stability and when necessary, to Defeat Adversaries.”58   
a. Shape 
US armed forces help shape the international environment through 
deterrence, peacetime engagement activities, and active participation and leadership in 
alliances.59 
b. Respond 
Should deterrence fail, it is imperative that the United States be able to 
defeat aggression of any kind.60  US armed forces will be able to respond to crises across 
the full range of military operations, fight (and win) wars, and conduct multiple smaller-
scale contingency operations. 
c. Prepare Now 
To be able to respond effectively in the future, US combat capabilities and 
supporting structures must be transformed.61 The conceptual template for joint operations 
and warfighting in the future—the military’s map for transformation—is articulated in 
the  Joint Vision series. 
(1). Joint Vision 2010. Joint Vision 2010 (JV2010) rests on the 
foundation of information superiority62 and technical innovation to transform the current 
                                                 
3. 
58 John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United 
States of America, Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era (Washington, DC: 
GPO, 1997) 2. 
 59 Ibid, 2. 
60 Ibid, 3. 
61 Ibid, 17. 
62 Information superiority is the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow 
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concepts of maneuver, strike, logistics, and protection into the new operational concepts 
of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full-spectrum 




Figure 4.   Joint Vision Path to Full Spectrum Dominance. (After: CJCS, Joint Vision 2020) 
 
(2). Joint Vision 2020. Joint Vision 2020 (JV2020) extends and 
expands the view of JV2010.  Full-spectrum dominance has become the general 
descriptor for the four operational concepts in JV2010.64 Technology is seen to still be 
important, but the emphasis has shifted to information superiority.  JV2020 acknowledges 
that advances in technology alone will be insufficient to ensure US strategic advantage 
given the likelihood that our adversaries will have access to the same technology in use 
by the US military. The overarching focus of JV2020 remains a joint force capable of full 
spectrum dominance, persuasive in peace, decisive in war, and preeminent in any form of 
conflict (see Figure 4). JV2020 focuses on three factors central to success of the original 
four concepts: Innovation, Interoperability, and Decision Superiority.65 Doctrinal changes 
                                                 
of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same. The word “superiority” 
implies a state or condition of imbalance in one’s favor. Information superiority is transitory in nature and 
must be created and sustained through the conduct of information operations. 
63 John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010 (Washington, DC: 
GPO, 1996) 1. 
64 The term “full-dimensional protection” has replaced “full-spectrum dominance” as the new 
operational concept for force protection. 
65 Decision superiority is arriving at a better decision and implementing it faster than an adversary can 
react.  While information superiority is a critical enabler, decision superiority does not automatically result 
from information superiority. Decision superiority results from superior information filtered through the 
commander’s experience, knowledge, training, and judgment; the expertise of supporting staffs and other 
organizations; and the efficiency of associated processes.  
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coupled with new technology are seen to be the key factors in enabling transformation to 
a force with a primary goal of achieving full spectrum dominance.66 
2. Unity of Effort and Unified Action 
Unity of effort involves the various components of an organization working 
towards a common goal.  Given that the NSS provides national goals the NMS should 
state military objectives that support the attainment of those national goals. Theater 
engagement plans produced by regional Commanders-in-Chief (CINC) support the 
military goals stated in the NMS and concurrently support the objectives of the NSS. 
Unified action within the military instrument of national power supports the national 
strategic unity of effort through close coordination with the other instruments of national 
power (diplomatic, economic, information).67 
3. Doctrine 
Doctrine is developed from the guidance and direction contained in the NSS and 
NMS.  It provides the framework through which to apply the military instrument of 
national power in order to achieve national objectives. 
C. THE ROLE OF IO IN SUPPORTING NATIONAL STRATEGY 
At the national strategic level information is used as an instrument of power (IOP) 
to convey a nation’s intent, policies, and expectations.   IO at the national strategic level 
is leveraged against the goals stated in the National Security Strategy. Integration of IO 
with the various national IOPs can create synergy—a product with value greater than the 
sum of its parts. 
IO is most effective when military IOP actions are coordinated with other IOP 
actions. The process to coordinate activities in situations requiring multiple components 
(diplomatic, humanitarian, intelligence, economic development) was established in 
Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD 56): Managing Complex Contingency 
Operations (see appendix E). PDD 56 directs establishment of a coordination committee 
that will enable the CINC to engage in shaping the environment before the start of 
                                                 
66 Henry Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020 (Washington, DC: GPO, 
2000) 3. 
67 JP 0-2, I-5. 
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hostilities by not only leveraging DoD organizations, but also various US government 
and non-governmental organizations (NGO) in support of peacekeeping operations. 
The National Strategy contains regional and transnational goals and objectives 
that may leverage any of the national instruments of power.  Leveraging multiple IOPs 
towards a common goal requires consistency and coherence.  Presidential Decision 
Directive 68 (PDD 68): International Public Information (see appendix G) was 
promulgated to improve the use of public information communicated to external (foreign) 
audiences.  The Department of Defense supports the efforts of PDD 68 via public affairs, 
PSYOP, and diplomacy.   
Military IO efforts must be coordinated with other national information IOP 
efforts must happen to ensure unity of effort.  PDD 56 provides a framework to achieve 
unity during crisis (specifically peacekeeping) while PDD 68 provides a framework to 
ensure promulgation of a common message to external audiences. 
D. INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN MILITARY OPERATIONS 
IO provides tools that can be used in regional engagements to shape the 
international environment in ways that advance US interests as well as in military 
operations in response to crisis or conflict (see Figure 5). 
1. The Spectrum of Operations 
IO occurs across the spectrum of military operations (peace, crisis/conflict, return 
to peace) and throughout the levels of war (see Figure 6). The goal of IO during 
peacetime is to shape or influence the environment and deter potential crises.  The 
Regional CINC tailors IO to support his area of responsibility (AOR) engagement plan to 
promote regional stability, deter aggressive behavior, and promote US national interests.  
Through military-to-military contacts, port visits, and civil relations the CINC is actively 




Figure 5.   Examples of IO Objectives. (After: Joint Pub. 3-13, Joint Doctrine for 
Information Operations) 
 
Should a regional crisis develop, the CINCs attention would turn toward the 
developing crisis by implementing IO to deter and coerce the potential adversary while 
still implementing broader theater-strategic IO across the AOR. A Joint Task Force (JTF) 
may be established by the CINC to address the crisis. The JTF commander (CJTF) is 
assigned control of forces by the CINC and is responsible for developing a course of 
action (COA) recommendation to the CINC that will lead to resolution of the crisis. The 
CJTF is also responsible for establishing and maintaining a joint staff with appropriate 
personnel from each of the service and functional components comprising the JTF.68  
Part of the JTF joint staff is the IO cell (discussed later). IO is focused on the crisis to 
deter the crisis from escalating or coercing the adversary into avoiding conflict.  If the 
crisis develops into conflict, IO is conducted at the operational level to impact adversary 
                                                 
68 JP 0-2, IV-11. 
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lines of communications (LOCs), logistics, command and control (C2), and related 
capabilities and activities. Operational level IO has the potential to support broader 
theater-strategic IO by degrading an adversary’s capability to organize, command, 
deploy, and sustain military forces and capabilities. Tactical level IO is conducted to 
achieve specific military objectives: affect adversary information and information 
systems relating to C2, intelligence, and other information-based processes directly 
relating to the conduct of military operations. 69  The purpose of operational and tactical 
IO is to defeat the adversary and compel him to agree to terms favorable to our interests.  
As the conflict comes to an end, the post-hostilities phase is entered and the JTF 
dissolves; the main IO focus again shifts toward theater-strategic activities, with 




Figure 6.   IO in the Spectrum of Conflict and Levels of War. (After: Joint Warfare Center, 
Joint Task Force Information Operations Handbook) 
      
A great deal of coordination needs to occur to ensure IO actions across the 
spectrum of conflict, at all levels of war, are fully integrated, coordinated, and 
synchronized.  
                                                 
69 JP 3-13, I-2. 
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2. The IO Cell 
The IO cell is the focal point for IO planning at the JTF level.  The IO cell is 
formed from representatives from each staff element, component, and supporting 
agencies of the JTF70. The IO cell is responsible for integration and deconfliction of 
capabilities required to achieve mission objectives.71 A fully functioning IO cell 
integrates a broad range of potential IO actions and activities that contribute to fulfilling 
the CJTFs objectives within the Joint Operations Area (JOA). The cell is shaped to fit the 
assigned mission and replaces the C2W cell. Ensuring that IO is an integral part of all 
joint military operations requires extensive planning and coordination among all the 
elements of the Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters; component headquarters; and other 




Figure 7.   Typical IO Cell Composition. (After: Joint Pub. 3-13, Joint Doctrine for 
Information Operations) 
                                                 
70 Appendix D contains a detailed discussion of “typical” IO cell members and their responsibilities. 
71 JP 3-13, V-3. 
72 Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Task Force Information Operations Handbook (Suffolk, Virginia: 
Joint Warfighting Center, 2001) 7. 
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IV. ORGANIZATIONS SUPPORTING IO 
The organizations listed below are the majority providers of external support to 
the CINCs and JTF commanders for the conduct of information operations. Each service 
branch (Air Force, Army, Navy) has an information warfare center to provide IW/C2W 
support, and there are numerous joint organizations to support IO.  The mission and 
general capabilities of these organizations are discussed below. 
A. SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS 
1. US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command 
The US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command 
(USACAPOC) is the headquarters for Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations 
units. USACAPOC is one of four major commands comprising the U.S. Army Special 
Operations Command. USAPOC has one active duty Psychological Operations unit, the 
4th Psychological Operations Group, with six battalions; and one active duty Civil Affairs 
unit, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion with six companies. Both units are located at Fort 
Bragg, N.C. The Army Reserve major subordinate units include the 2nd and 7th 
Psychological Operations Groups, each with four battalions and subordinate companies 
and the 350th, 351st, 352nd, and 353rd Civil Affairs Commands, each with subordinate 
brigades and battalions.73 
Although Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations activities often complement 
each other, each battle system operates individually in support of field commanders. 
a. Psychological Operations Group 
           The Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Group plans and conducts PSYOP 
activities authorized and implemented worldwide in support of all non-mobilization 
contingencies during crisis and open hostilities short of declared war. It also develops, 
coordinates, and executes peacetime PSYOP activities. In addition, should war be 
                                                 
73 US Army Special Operations Command, “US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations 
Command Fact Sheet,” 16 March 2002, <http://www.soc.mil/pao/factsht/capoc/capocfs1.htm>.  
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declared, the PSYOP Group assists in the planning and execution of strategic and 
operational PSYOP for the CINC.74 
           The PSYOP Regional Support Battalion (RSB) consists of a headquarters 
element, a support company, and one or more regional support companies. Each regional 
battalion divides geographic responsibility between their subordinate companies and 
further to the individual Product Development Centers (PDC) at the Operational 
Detachment (OPDET) level. A PDC consist of a team of 10-15 soldiers who develop 
audio, visual, and audiovisual product prototypes in support of the PSYOP campaigns. 
Each RSB is supported by a Strategic Studies Detachment (SSD) that is staffed by 
civilian analysts and produces PSYOP studies for the regional CINC.75 
b. Civil Affairs 
           Civil Affairs (CA) units are designed to prevent civilian interference with 
tactical operations, to assist commanders in discharging their responsibilities toward the 
civilian population, and to provide liaison with civilian government agencies. With 
specialists in every area of the government, CA units can assist a host government meet 
its people’s needs and maintain a stable and viable civil administration. Civil affairs units 
help the CINC and JTF commander attain their objectives during peace, contingency 
operations and conflict.76 
2. Air Force Information Warfare Center 
The Air Force Information Warfare Center (AFIWC) mission is to create 
information warfare (IW) capabilities to meet requirements for aerospace and joint 
forces.  AFIWC produces IW analyses/data for combat operations, targeting, and 
acquisition programs.  Additionally, AFIWC explores, demonstrates, and exercises IW 
capabilities, tests weapons, develops tactics, trains forces, and assesses IW vulnerabilities 
of units and systems for offensive and defensive counter-information missions.77 
                                                 
74 US Army Special Operations Command, “Psychological Operations,” 16 March 2002, 
<http://www.soc.mil/pao/factsht/capoc/psyopfs.htm>. 
75 Ibid. 
76 US Army Special Operations Command, “Civil Affairs,” 16 March 2002, 
<http://www.soc.mil/pao/factsht/capoc/cafacts1.htm>. 
77 US Air Force Information Warfare Center, “IO Directorate Mission,” 9 March 2002, 
<http://afiwcweb.lackland.af.mil/offices/missin.htm>. 
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3. Fleet Information Warfare Center 
The Fleet Information Warfare Center (FIWC) is the Navy IW Center of 
Excellence and acts as the Fleet CINC  principal agent for IW/C2W tactics, training, and 
procedures. FIWC provides IW/IO support to naval and Joint forces worldwide; advises 
the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Fleet CINCs, Commander Naval Security Group 
Command, and Naval Systems Commands on IW/IO issues; and acts as the Navy’s 
primary authority for IW/IO. FIWC is responsible to provide Computer Incident 
Response, Vulnerability Analysis and Assistance, and Incident Measurement protect 
services to fleet and shore establishments. The Center provides the facilities, equipment, 
and personnel for directing the defensive information warfare program, including 
detecting and responding to computer attacks.78 
Specifically, FIWC is chartered to: support fleet and CJTFs by providing a variety 
of IW/IO services including tactics, doctrine, and operational planning support; staff 
augmentation; and training; defend the Navy’s Information Infrastructure as the Navy’s 
hub for Computer Network Defense operations; identify Fleet and Navy IW/IO 
requirements; coordinate programmatic support; and develop policies, plans, tactics, 
techniques, and procedures for prototype IW/IO systems; and provide Electronic 
Intelligence (ELINT) parametrics for the Navy’s Electronic Warfare Reprogrammable 
Libraries (EWRL) Program, and distribute tailored EWRL threat libraries containing 
ELINT parameters and Electronic Orders of Battle to Fleet/Navy/Joint consumers.79 
4. Land Information Warfare Center 
The Land Information Warfare Center (LIWA) provides Information Warfare and 
Command and Control Warfare support to land component and separate Army 
commands to facilitate planning and execution of Information Operations. LIWA is 
specifically organized and equipped to provide tailored IO support in the form of Field 
Support Teams (FST). LIWA mission-tailored FSTs deploy in response to a request for 
IO support. The FSTs provide direct support to Army Service Component Commands, 
                                                 
78 Federation of American Scientists, “Fleet Information Warfare Center,” 9 March 2002, 
<http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/navsecgru/fiwc/index.html>. 
79 Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Task Force Information Operations Handbook (Suffolk, VA: Joint 
Warfighting Center, 2001) 10. 
34 
Army Force Commanders and corps and divisions as requested. For long duration 
missions, FSTs deploy in an attached status and become part of the supported command’s 
IO cell. LIWA FSTs are able to: Provide comprehensive IO analysis and support, support 
OPLAN/OPORD development, assist in planning and synchronizing IO asset 
employment, assist in development of target lists, estimates and assessments; monitor and 
assess current operations for IO implications, and provide IO expertise not resident on the 
supported commander’s staff. 80 
5. Naval Information Warfare Center 
The Naval Information Warfare Activity (NIWA) is the Navy’s principal 
technical agent to research, assess, develop and prototype Information Warfare (IW) 
capabilities.  NIWA supports the development capabilities encompassing all aspects of 
IW attack, protect and exploit. A key focus of efforts in this line is providing tactical 
commanders with an IW Mission Planning, Analysis, and Command and Control 
Targeting System (IMPACTS) tool. An aggressive program is maintained to acquire and 
analyze state-of-the-art technologies (software and hardware), evaluate fleet applicability 
and prototype developmental capabilities. NIWA is the Navy’s interface with other 
Service and National IW organizations, working closely with the Fleet Information 
Warfare Center (FIWC) to develop of IW technical capabilities for Navy and Joint 
Operations.81 
B. JOINT ORGANIZATIONS 
1. Joint C4ISR Battle Center 
The mission of the Joint C4ISR Battle Center (JBC) is to lead near-term 
transformation of Joint Force C4ISR capability through technology assessments with 
recommendations for rapid insertion of solutions to support identified CINC 
interoperability needs in the JTF.  The JBC is also chartered to foster rapid near-term 
insertion of technology (including identification of impacts on doctrine, training, and 
                                                 
80 Center for Army Lessons Learned, “LIWA Operational Structure,” 9 March 2002, 
<http://call.army.mil>. 
81 Federation of American Scientists, “NIWA,” 10 March 2002, 
<http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/navsecgru/niwa/>. 
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personnel) and to provide a learning and experimentation environment for the warfighter 
and the technologists. 82  
The JBC focuses its effort at the JTF level of C4ISR in support of Commander in 
Chief (CINC) requirements, but allows movement up to the CINC and down to the 
component command level. The end result is a recommendation that will lead to fielded 
interoperable capabilities, meeting the joint warfighter’s needs as defined through the 
CINCs requirements process and using technological advancements on a near real-time 
basis. These recommendations are based on assessments conducted in an operational 
environment, measuring not only jointness and utility but also identifying potential costs, 
manning impacts, doctrinal impacts, organizational impacts, and training impacts. The 
JBC directly supports the CINCs in this area by validating the current and proposed 
warfighter systems’ jointness, maturity, interoperability and utility. The JBC identifies 
systems which clearly demonstrate joint value added or identifies non-interoperable 
systems for elimination.83 
2. Joint Spectrum Center 
The mission of the Joint Spectrum Center (JSC) is to ensure the Department of 
Defense’s effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum in support of national security 
and military objectives. The Joint Spectrum Center (JSC) serves as the Department of 
Defense center of excellence for electromagnetic spectrum management matters.  The 
JSC maintains expertise in the following areas: spectrum planning, electromagnetic 
compatibility/vulnerability, electromagnetic environmental effects, information systems, 
modeling and simulation, operations support, and system acquisition.  JSC provides 
spectrum-related services to support the Director for Command, Control, Communication 
and Computer Systems, Joint Staff (J6), The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (OASD/C3I), the Unified 
Commands, Military Departments and defense agencies. The JSC supports the 
                                                 




Information Protect missions of Information Warfare (IW) as they relate to spectrum 
supremacy.84 
The JSC provides direct support to Unified Command, Joint Task Force, and Joint 
Staff Information Warfare/Command Control Warfare (IW/C2W) cells, and indirect 
support for operational military IW/C2W planning provided through the Joint 
Information Operations Center (JIOC), service branch IW activities, and IW/C2W 
elements of the Intelligence Community. This effort is conducted under the mission area 
of “supporting electronic protect missions of information warfare as they relate to 
spectrum supremacy”. The support provided ranges from EW deconfliction analyses to 
supporting IW red team efforts as they relate to spectrum dependent matters.85 
3. Joint Communications Security Monitoring Agency 
The Joint Communications Security (COMSEC) Monitoring Agency (JCMA) 
provides a Joint COMSEC monitoring and analysis team to provide direct, deployable 
Joint COMSEC monitoring support.  If tasked, the JCMA may manage all Information 
Security (INFOSEC) monitoring.86 
4. Joint Communications Support Element 
The mission of the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) is to provide 
simultaneous communications support for two joint task force (JTF) headquarters and 
two joint special operations task force (JSOTF) headquarters.87 
Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) is a subordinate unified command 
of U.S. Joint Forces Command. The commanding officer and his staff provide joint task 
force and joint special operations task force command, control, communications and 
computer systems (C4) support for America’s premier war-fighting commands and the 
Joint Staff. JCSE has provided responsive and reliable tactical communications support 
from nearly every part of the world. Due to its diverse tasking and flexible capabilities to 
                                                 
84 Joint Spectrum Center, “Mission Statement,” 10 March 2002, 
<http://www.jsc.mil/jschome/mission.asp>. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Task Force Information Operations Handbook (Suffolk, VA: Joint 
Warfighting Center, 2001) 10. 
87 US Joint Forces Command, “About the Joint Communications Support Element,” 10 March 2002, 
<http://www.jfcom.mil/About/com_jcse.htm>. 
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provide reliable communications from anywhere in the world, JCSE is “the voice heard 
around the world.”88 
5. Joint Information Operations Center 
The Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC) mission is to assist in planning, 
coordinating and executing information operations. JIOC is the key organization in the 
Department of Defense specifically designed to support IO planning.  It is officially 
designated as the Department of Defense “center of excellence for information 
operations”.  Falling under USSPACECOM, the JIOC provides combatant commanders 
and Commanders Joint Task (CJTFs) with teams of IO specialists. JIOC personnel 
augment the JTF IO cell and provide full spectrum IO support directly to the JTF. The 
center deploys information operations planning teams worldwide on short notice to 
deliver tailored, highly skilled support and sophisticated models and simulations to joint 
commanders, joint task forces and the Joint Staff. The JIOC was established in 
September 1999, the next iteration of the Joint Command and Control Warfare Center 
(JC2WC), which was formed from the nucleus of the former Joint Electronic Warfare 
Center (JEWC).  The JIOC provides direct C2W tactical and technical analytical support 
to operational commanders. The JIOC supports the integration of operations security, 
psychological operations, military deception, electronic warfare and destruction 
throughout the planning and execution phases of the operations. Direct support is 
provided to unified commands, joint task forces, functional and service components, and 
subordinate combat commanders. Support is also provided to the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense, the Joint Staff, the services and other government agencies. The JIOC 
maintains specialized expertise in C2W systems engineering, operational applications, 
capabilities and vulnerabilities.89 
6. Joint Warfare Analysis Center 
The Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) mission is to assist the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and commanders of unified commands in their preparation and 
analysis of Joint operational plans.  JWAC is a subordinate unified command of U.S. 
                                                 
88 Ibid. 
89 US Air Force Air Intelligence Agency, “Factsheet,” 5 March 2002, 
<http://www.af.mil/news/factsheets/Air_Intelligence_Agency.html>. 
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Joint Forces Command tasked to provide CINC planners will full-spectrum analytical 
products while giving synergistic, effects-based, precision targeting options for select 
infrastructure networks to support planning and execution of military options. JWAC 
maintains direct liaison staffs with CINCs, Joint Staff, Department of Defense and non-
Department of Defense agencies.90 
JWAC develops and adapts modeling and simulation technologies for analysis, 
computation and the presentation of options to combatant commands, the Joint Staff and 
other customers. Furthermore, JWAC assesses strategic and operational planning and 
participates in the development of new methodologies and technologies in support of 
joint experimentation, wargaming, precision management and other activities.  
7. Joint Warfighting Center 
The Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) improves joint readiness by providing 
world-wide training and training support, assisting in the preparation of integrated and 
interoperable forces for future joint and multinational operations. It also provides 
management and integration of joint capable models and simulations and provides 
leadership in development of joint doctrine and joint training initiatives.91 
8. Joint Project Office for Special Technology Countermeasures 
The Joint Project Office for Special Technology Countermeasures (JPO-STC) 
mission is to support the Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs), the military services, and 
Department of Defense (DoD) mission planners by analyzing dependencies on supporting 
infrastructure, by assessing impacts of infrastructure disruptions to missions, and by 
identifying mitigation options that strengthen operational posture. JPO-STC has the 
ability to assess the JTFs infrastructure dependencies and the potential impact on 
operations resulting from disruptions.  From an infrastructure assurance perspective, JPO-
STC is responsive to a full range of military operations from deliberate planning through 
continuity of operations.  A foundation of systems engineering and operations research 
principles has produced a core capability that addresses the integration of complex 
                                                 
90 US Joint Forces Command, “About the Joint Warfare Analysis Center,” 11 March 2002, 
<http://137.246.33.101/About/com_jwac.htm>. 
91 US Joint Forces Command, “About the Joint Warfighting Center,” 11 March 2002, 
<http://137.246.33.101/About/com_jwfc.htm>. 
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network modeling, analysis and assessment, data collection, information management, 
decision support architectures, and risk management strategies. This foundation allows 
JPO-STC analysts to construct detailed characterizations of local or regional network 
configurations, which are then linked to warfighting execution plans, ultimately resulting 
in decision support products that address total risk-based management concerns.92 
9. Joint Task Force for Computer Network Operations  
The mission of Joint Task Force for Computer Network Operations (JTF-CNO) is 
to, in conjunction with the unified commands, services and Department of Defense 
agencies, coordinate and direct the defense of computer systems and networks; and, when 
directed, coordinate and conduct computer network attack in support of CINCs and 
national objectives. The JTF-CNO components are the Land Information Warfare 
Activity (LIWA), Marine Forces-Computer Network Defense (MARFOR-CND), Navy 
Component Task Force-Computer Network Defense (NCTF-CND), Air Force 
Information Warfare Center (AFIWC) and DISAs Department of Defense Computer 
Emergency Response Team (DoD CERT).93 
C. OTHER ORGANIZATIONS 
The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) is a combat support agency 
responsible for planning, developing, fielding, operating, and supporting command, 
control, communications, and information systems that serve the needs of the President, 
the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commanders in Chief 
(CINCs), and other Department of Defense (DoD) Components under all conditions of 






                                                 
92 Joint Program Office for Special Technical Operations, 15 March 2002, 
<http://www.nswc.navy.mil/iap/jpo/about.htm>. 
93 US Space Command, “JTF-CNO Factsheet,” 15 March 2002, 
<http://www.peterson.af.mil/usspacecom/jtf-cno.htm>. 















































V. THE PROBLEM WITH IO 
A. DOCTRINE 
Joint Doctrine directs that IO be an integral part of joint military operations and 
recognizes that “extensive planning and coordination among many elements of the joint 
headquarters, component staffs, and other USG departments and agencies to ensure IO 
are fully integrated with other portions of operation and campaign plans.”95  Joint 
Doctrine further discusses the need for a “reporting structure linked to intelligence, 
counterintelligence, law enforcement, policy makers, and the information systems 
community, both government and commercial” which “is essential to defensive IO.”96 
Joint Doctrine for Information Operations describes an IO cell as the mechanism 
to plan, integrate, and execute IO.  As discussed in chapter III, the IO cell is a complex 
and elaborate structure with members from disparate service and functional components.  
To make things worse, the IO cell is usually established in response to a developing crisis 
and that newly established cell “may be required to plan and/or execute IO immediately 
upon arrival in the operational area.”97  According to Joint IO Doctrine, a fully 
functioning IO cell is “paramount to successful IO.”98 It is difficult to achieve full 
functionality in a complex organization (like the IO cell), but, given time, it does happen.  
Expecting immediate full functionality from a newly established IO cell seems nearly 
impossible given that IO must be carefully conceived, coordinated, and executed in order 
to contribute to the mission.99  
Joint Pub 3-13 provides an effective doctrinal foundation for the conduct in IO in 
joint operations.  It provides a conceptual understanding of IO and discusses integration 
                                                 
95 Ibid, IV-1. USG is US Government. 
96 Ibid, III-12. . Implies an organization at the national level.  This concept will be discussed only 
briefly in this thesis; however, it is an excellent area for further research. See Information Operations and 
Unity of Effort: The Case for a Joint Inter-agency Information Operations Task Force (Matt Straughan, US 
Naval War College Essay, 1997) and Organizational Structure for Inter-Agency Information Operations 
(Richard Dougherty and Pablo Mir, Naval Postgraduate School Master’s Thesis, 2001) for additional 
information. 
97 Ibid, IV-2. 
98 Ibid, IV-1. 
99 Ibid, I-19. 
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and synchronization of IO, both offensive and defensive, in the planning and execution of 
combatant commanders’ (CINCs) plans and operations to support the strategic, 
operational and tactical levels of warfare (including peacetime engagement).100 The need 
for integration and synchronization of IO with other US Government organizations is 
clearly stated: “IO support the national military strategy but require support, 
coordination, and participation by other USG departments and agencies as well as 
commercial industry.”101  
The fundamental flaw in IO doctrine is that it implicitly directs the IO planner to a 
forum for coordination and synchronization of multiple and varied departments and 
agencies that simply does not exist.  This is not to say the doctrine does not provide a 
foundation of IO concepts and the requirement to coordinate in order to achieve unity of 
effort and unified action when executing IO—it does.  However, reading IO doctrine and 
then attempting to plan and execute IO is analogous to climbing an ornate staircase that 
leads to nowhere.  There is clearly a need for an Information Operations organization at 
the joint military-strategic (unified command) level to integrate, coordinate, deconflict, 
and synchronize information activities within the Department of Defense. There are, 
however, organizations in charge of various components of IO.  Unified commanders are 
responsible for computer network operations (SPACECOM)102 and psychological 
operations/civil affairs (SOCOM).103  There is an Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) 
for IO, another ASD for public affairs, and still another ASD for psychological 
operations.104 This certainly seems like more than enough department chiefs to do the 
job, and it may be; the problem is that no council exists to bring these chiefs together in 
                                                 
100 Ibid, introduction. The author’s opinion is that JP 3-13 does provide an effective foundation for IO. 
101 Ibid, I-11. Another reference to a national level organization. 
102 US Space Command, “JTF-CNO Fact Sheet,” 10 February 2002, 
<http://www.peterson.af.mil/usspacecom/jtf-cno.htm>. SPACECOM was assigned responsibility for CND 
and CNA; CNA and CND together comprise CNO. JIOC is also assigned to SPACECOM. 
103 US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, “USACAPOC Fact Sheet,” 12 
March 2002, <http://www.soc.mil/pao/factsht/capoc/capocfs1.htm>. All Army CA and PSYOP units report 
to USACAPOC (subordinate to Army Special Operations Command, who is a subordinate command of 
SOCOM). 
104 ASD-C3I for IO, ASD-PA for public affairs, and ASD-Special Operations and Low Intensity 
Conflict (SOLIC) for PSYOP. 
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order to address a Department of Defense (military) information strategy or IO activities; 
there is no military organization with the charter and authority to oversee IO. 
B. IS IT REALLY A PROBLEM? 
1. Executive Direction 
There is a range of Executive Orders and Presidential Decision Directives (see 
appendices E-I) that touch on some aspect of IO and the military/Department of Defense.  
In fact, the Department of Defense is a primary participant in each. Some may argue that 
the organizations and structures mandated in those orders and directives are sufficient and 
the  Department of Defense does not need to pursue the establishment of an intra-agency 
IO organization. However, as explained below, those orders and directives do not 
discourage the development of a Department of Defense IO authority—they very nearly 
demand its creation. 
a. Presidential Decision Directive 56  
Presidential Decision Directive 56, Managing Complex Contingency 
Operations, was written to deal with the complexities of a peacekeeping mission. It 
specifically excludes military operations conducted in defense of the US.  The intent of 
PDD 56 is to provide a forum in order to establish unity of effort among US government 
(i.e., interagency) and international agencies (such as may be encountered in a coalition) 
involved in peacekeeping operations. IO would be an important factor in the success of 
such a mission, and the interagency coordination framework specified in PDD 56 would 
support the IO effort.  The Department of Defense, as the military side of the political-
military (Pol-Mil) establishment, plays a vital role in ensuring unity of effort by 
developing the Pol-Mil strategy. Primary Department of Defense support comes in the 
form of public affairs, civil affairs, and PSYOP. 
b. Presidential Decision Directive 63 
           Presidential Decision Directive 63, Critical Infrastructure Protection, 
establishes a structure and specifies lead agencies for “Sectors” and “Special 
Functions.”105  The Department of Defense is the Special Function Lead Agency for 
                                                 
105 Sector refers to a critical infrastructure area that could be a target for information or physical 
attack. Sector Liaisons bridge the gap between public and private counterparts within a sector. Special 
Functions refer to the critical infrastructure areas that are the responsibility of the US government. 
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National Defense.  The Department of Defense is tasked with assisting other government 
agencies and the private sector in developing security related best business practices. The 
National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) and the Information Sharing Analysis 
Center (ISAC) maintain the critical infrastructure protection mandated by PDD 63.  
These centers are primarily engaged in computer network defense. Department of 
Defense support to PDD 63 is JTF-CNO to further augment CND and provide response 
options.   
c. Presidential Decision Directive 68 
           Presidential Decision Directive 68, International Public Information, 
provides the structure for the coordination of public affairs at the national level.  The 
intent of PDD 68 is to establish a framework enabling use of the information national 
IOP. This IOP will be wielded to influence foreign audiences in support of US policies 
and to counteract propaganda and deception employed by adversaries.  As discussed in 
chapter III, the Department of Defense supports the efforts of PDD 68 via public affairs, 
PSYOP, and diplomacy. 
2. Conclusion 
Each of the directives above involves the Department of Defense in a top-level 
planning role. None of the directives provide for an organization able to conduct full-
spectrum IO.   Each directive specifies Department of Defense support for a different 
component of IO. The best way to maximize limited resources and achieve unity of effort 
within the Department of Defense is to have a single agency responsible for all IO 
aspects and assign appropriate representatives as required rather than establish a separate 
Department of Defense liaison team for each structure.  Again, the need is demonstrated 
for an Information Operations organization at the joint military-strategic (unified 
command) level to integrate, coordinate, deconflict, and synchronize information 
activities within the Department of Defense (and with other agencies). 
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C. SOLVING THE PROBLEM 
1. Possible Solutions 
a. Reduced Scope IO 
The simplest way to solve the IO problem is to limit the scope of military 
IO to address only Command and Control Warfare (C2W).  With this method a much 
more focused approach towards interagency coordination can be taken. There would be 
no shift in organizational structure required; the military would simply be tasked with 
executing C2W in support of strategic IO being coordinated by other agencies.  The focus 
of C2W is exclusively at the operational and tactical levels, which is well within the 
comfort zone of the military.  IO in the military is an evolution from C2W—the JIOC 
existed in its last “life” as the Joint Command and Control Warfare (C2W) Center. The 
reluctance of the services to embrace IO (vice C2W) may be explained by Douhet, who 
writes: 
…to break away from the past is disturbing….If we have a 
tendency to deviate as little as possible from the beaten 
path, we will find ourselves diverging from reality, and we 
will wind up far removed from the realities of our time.106 
When the military (like any organization or individual) does not know 
what to do, it does what it knows—while this seems to be the most obvious and simple 
answer there is still a significant drawback: it will not solve the problem.  Even if the 
military focuses solely on C2W, there will still be a need to coordinate, synchronize, and 
integrate the C2W component with other components of IO. Adopting this course of 
action leaves you with a less capable force that has the same integration problem you 
started out trying to solve. 
b. Unified Commander for IO 
Having learned that the problem of coordination, synchronization, and 
integration can not be solved by looking the other way we, by process of elimination, 
have arrived at the other solution to the problem: Establish an IO organization at the 
unified command level—Information Command (INFOCOM)—to integrate, coordinate, 
deconflict, and synchronize information activities within the Department of Defense.  
                                                 
106 Giulio Douhet, “The New Form of War,” in Air War College Strategy, Doctrine, and Air Power, 
Book II (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, August 1997) 27. 
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2. Why at the Unified Command Level?  
Joint Pub. 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces, sets forth criteria, which, if met, 
normally require the establishment of a unified command: 
When either or both of the following criteria apply 
generally to a situation, a unified command normally is 
required to secure the necessary unity of effort. (1) A broad 
continuing mission exists requiring execution by significant 
forces of two or more Military Departments and 
necessitating a single strategic direction. (2) Any 
combination of the following exists and significant forces 
of two or more Military Departments are involved: (a) A 
large-scale operation requiring positive control of tactical 
execution by a large and complex force; (b) A large 
geographic or functional area requiring single responsibility 
for effective coordination of the operations therein; and/or 
(c) Necessity for common use of limited logistic means. 
INFOCOM meets the requirement of a broad continuing mission necessitating a 
single strategic direction easily. Placing IO oversight responsibility at the unified 
command level would achieve the unity of effort for military IO that currently does not 
exist. The principle of unity of effort argues against establishing an individual IO JTF to 
assist and support each geographic CINC without a structure to direct each regional JTF.   
Without the oversight and guidance INFOCOM would provide it is possible for each 
regional JTF-IO to independently approach the problem—counter to the unity of effort 
axiom.  The JTF-IO solution creates an environment conducive to duplication of effort. 
Manpower and money are available in limited quantities—they are resources that must be 
wisely allocated against a prioritized requirements list.  The unified command approach 
can best wield available resources to achieve maximum results. 
b. Historical Justification.  
Looking to the past often provides answers for the present. IO in the US 
military is currently a conglomeration of capabilities from the different services just as 
special operations forces (SOF) were prior to the establishment of SOCOM—a functional 
unified command for special operations. 
On November 4, 1979 a mob in Iran stormed the US Embassy and took 
the staff and US Marine security force as hostages—53 Americans were captured and 
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were being held by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. A rescue mission was launched with 
a mixture of assets from all four services, including Army and Air Force SOF assets. On 
the evening of April 24, 1980, an elite US military force launched a bold attempt 
codenamed Eagle Claw to rescue their fellow American citizens held hostage in Tehran. 
In the early hours of April 25, the effort ended disastrously with the deaths of 8 US 
servicemen at a desolate site in the Iranian desert called Desert One. The rescue turned 
out to be a dismal failure despite extensive planning and rehearsal due to the lack of 
integration and coordination among the forces involved.107  
In response to the failure of Eagle Claw, Congress mandated the creation 
of SOCOM in 1987 to correct serious deficiencies in the ability of the United States to 
conduct special operations and engage in low-intensity conflict activities. The command 
was assigned many service-like responsibilities, including training, ensuring combat 
readiness, monitoring personnel promotions and assignments, and developing and 
acquiring SOF-peculiar equipment. SOCOM was also given responsibility for managing 
a separate major force program (MFP), MFP-11, which ensures the SOF program has 
visibility at the Department of Defense and congressional levels. These last two tasks 
give SOCOM great flexibility in training, equipping, and employing its forces. 
CINCSOC is the sole unified commander with responsibility for planning, programming, 
and budgeting of military forces. In addition, he has the authority similar to that of a 
service chief for the development and acquisition of special operations-peculiar 
equipment, materials, supplies, and services. In short, he is the only CINC with a 
checkbook.108 Today, fifteen years after SOCOM was established, the US has the best-
equipped, most-capable special operations forces in the world. 
c. IO in Action 
Operation Allied Force109 has been termed the first “media war,” where 
the power of instantaneous information and well-placed images elevated minor tactical 
                                                 
107 US Air Force Association, “Operation Eagle Claw,” 29 March 2002, 
<http://www.afa.org/magazine/0199desertone.html>. Other factors contributing to failure included the 
distance the forces had to travel, weather unpredictability, and stringent time requirements. 
108 GlobalSecurity.org, “US Special Operations Command,” 19 March 2002,  
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/socom.htm>. 
109 NATO operation commenced 24 March 1999. Its purpose was to bring an end to hostilities 
committed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia against ethnic Albanians in the southern province of 
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events to the strategic level and threatened to undermine political and military coalitions  
in the process.110 The physical war was well-planned and well-conducted, but the 
information war was not, lacking both concentration of forces and actions (unity of 
effort).111 
From the beginning, the Serbs launched information attacks in the form of 
propaganda.  Well before the bombs fell in the Balkans, allied IO cells were organized at 
the command and joint task force levels, tasked to integrate—and employ—the diverse 
tools of IO (civil affairs, electronic warfare, intelligence, and public information) in an 
effort to achieve information superiority.112 Even with IO cells established, the allied 
forces fell far behind; according to Admiral James Ellis, CJTF-NOBLE ANVIL:113 
“The enemy deliberately and criminally killed innocents by 
the thousands, but no one saw it….We accidentally killed 
innocents, sometimes by the dozens, and the world watched 
on the evening news. We were continuously reacting, 
investigating, and trying to answer ‘how could this 
happen?’ ”114 
Admiral Ellis’ after-action brief stated that the IO campaign was “at once 
a great success and perhaps the greatest failure of the war. All the tools were in place 
[but] only a few were used."115 He observed that the personnel in charge of IO were "too 
junior and from the wrong communities to have the required impact on planning and 
execution."116 Testament to the power of IO is his statement that "properly executed, IO 
                                                 
Kosovo. Federation of American Scientists, “Operation Allied Force,” 29 March 2002, 
<http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/allied_force.htm>. 
110 Gary Pounder, Air Power Journal, “Opportunity Lost: Public Affairs, Information Operations, and 
the Air War Over Serbia,” 29 March 2002, 
<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj00/sum00/pounder.htm> 
111 Robin Grantham, Air War Over Serbia: It is Important to Win the Information War (Maxwell 
AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 2000) v. 
112 Pounder. 
113 ‘Noble Anvil’ was the operation name for US involvement in the NATO operation ‘Allied Force’ 
in Kosovo. Federation of American Scientists, “Operation Allied Force,” 29 March 2002, 
<www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/allied_force.htm+noble+anvil>. 





could have halved the length of the campaign."117 His statements, while subjective, are 
supported by the Department of Defense Report to Congress on US actions in Kosovo 
which stated, in reference to IO, that: 
Successfully conducting operations to disrupt or confuse an 
enemy’s ability to collect, process, and disseminate 
information is increasingly important in this information 
age of warfare. The importance of such capabilities was 
recognized fully during Operation Allied Force, but the 
conduct of integrated information operations was 
hampered by the lack of advance planning and necessary 
strategic guidance to define key objectives.118 (emphasis 
added) 
While the aftermath of Allied Force/Noble Anvil is certainly not as tragic 
as that of Operation Eagle Claw, there are similarities. After-action analysis reveals 
serious deficiencies in the capability of the American military to conduct IO, just as the 
debacle at Desert One revealed our difficulties in conducting special operations. The 
establishment of SOCOM effectively integrated and synchronized the special operations 
forces of the different branches of the military and forged a special operations force 
capable of effectively supporting the regional CINCs. Under SOCOM, SOF has become a 
true force multiplier—in recent US involvement in Afghanistan, SOF dramatically 
increased the effectiveness of the air campaign and on the ground they turned the 
Northern Alliance into a conquering army.119 Likewise, the establishment of a unified 
command responsible for IO can integrate and synchronize the IO capabilities of the 
different branches of the military. With a unified IO commander, regional CINCs will be 
supported by properly trained personnel who are the right rank and from the right 
communities to have an impact on IO planning, integration, and execution. The unified 
command is the way to maximize the force multiplier capability that IO brings. 
3. A New Unified Command? 
Given the potential benefits, the question now becomes ‘How to establish a 
unified Information Operations command?’ There are really only two options: Establish a 
                                                 
117 Ibid. 
118 US Department of Defense, Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action 
Report (Washington, DC:  2001) 98-99. 
119 US Department of Defense, “DoD News: Special Briefing on SOF Capability,” 29 March 2002, 
<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec2001/t12122001_t1212sof.html>. 
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new, separate unified command (similar to the creation of SOCOM) or assigning and 
existing unified command INFOCOM responsibilities. Given the difficulties and fiscal 
burden that were experienced when SOCOM was established120 a new, separate unified 
command does not seem fiscally feasible.  However, a new subordinate unified command 
established under an existing CINC would involve minimal expense.  The subordinate 
unified command concept is ideal for INFOCOM per the guidance provided below from 
Joint Pub. 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces:  
When authorized by the NCA [Secretary of Defense] 
through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
commanders of the unified commands may establish 
subordinate unified commands (also called subunified 
commands) to conduct operations on a continuing basis in 
accordance with the criteria set forth for unified commands.  
A subordinate unified command may be established on a 
geographic area or functional basis. Commanders of 
subordinate unified commands have functions and 
responsibilities similar to those of the commanders of 
unified commands and exercise OPCON of assigned 
commands and forces and normally over attached forces 
within the assigned JOA or functional area.  
4. Which Unified Command? 
There are only nine existing unified commands (see appendix C); the issue at 
hand is which unified command is the best choice to serve as the “parent” for 
INFOCOM? The logical candidates are Strategic Command (STRATCOM) (the 
potentially devastating effect of IO has often been compared to the effects of weapons of 
mass destruction), Space Command (SPACECOM), Special Operations Command 
(SOCOM), and Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). The reasoning behind these selections 
is explained below. 
a. Strategic Command 
STRATCOM was initially selected because of the comparison of the 
potential destructive effects of IO to that of weapons of mass destruction. This similarity 
could necessitate the same centralized planning, control, and execution system currently 
in place for strategic nuclear weapons. STRATCOM, charged with centralized strategic 
                                                 
120 Susan Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding US Special Operations Forces (Washington, 
DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997). This work details the process and heated battle that ensued.  
Eventually, against the desires of the Pentagon, Congress forcibly legislated SOCOM into existence.  
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IO planning, would develop a single integrated information operating plan to be executed 
upon Presidential direction.  STRATCOM is an organization that has never had to 
execute its mission.121 The IO-to-nuclear analogy would seem to indicate that IO is a tool 
that can never be used. The national interest is better served by a policy that allows 
employment of IO options.122  
b. Space Command 
SPACECOM was initially selected because of the assigned responsibility 
for computer network operations and the presence of the JIOC in the SPACECOM chain 
of command. The recommendation to assign SPACECOM CND (later CNA, then CNO) 
responsibility came from the (in the author’s opinion, flawed) assumption that since we 
are relying more on space infrastructure for information movement the owners of the 
infrastructure should be responsible for the defense of the infrastructure.123 This is a 
violation of George Stein’s edict not to confuse the battle with the battlespace; assigning 
SPACECOM IO authority because of the fact that a large portion of information travels 
via the satellite information infrastructure follows the same logic as assigning the Navy 
responsibility for inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM) because their submarines 
carry a lot of them. 
c. Special Operations Command 
SOCOM was initially selected because of the PSYOP and CA forces 
assigned. IO is considered by some to be a component of special operations—indeed, 
special operations forces have supported IO in numerous operations.124 A comparison of 
the JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, definitions and concepts for 
Information Operations and Special Information Operations with the JP 1-02, 
                                                 
121 To the extent of employing nuclear weapons in combat. STRATCOM successfully engages in its 
mission of strategic deterrence daily. 
122 Bass, 34. 
123 Also the fact that SPACECOM is traditionally an Air Force (without a doubt the most successful 
politicians in DoD) headed command; IO comes with money, and SPACECOM lobbied to have CNO 
responsibility assigned to them.  
124 Frederick Gottschalk, The Role of Special Forces in Information Operations, Master’s Thesis (Fort 
Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and Staff College, 2000) 87. Details special forces 
involvement/contribution to IO in operations Just Cause, Desert Storm, Noble Obelisk, and Joint Guard. 
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Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, definition of 
Special operations yields the following similarities: 
Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and 
equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve 
military, political, economic, or psychological objectives 
by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or 
politically sensitive area. These operations are conducted 
during peacetime, conflict, and war, independently or in 
coordination with operations of conventional, non-special 
operations forces. Political-military considerations 
frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, 
covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the 
national level. Special operations differ from conventional 
operations in degree of physical and political risk, 
operational techniques, mode of employment, independence 
from friendly support, and dependence on detailed 
operational intelligence and indigenous assets. (emphasis 
added)125  
The similarities between the IO/SIO and special operations, current 
assignment of PSYOP/CA forces, and the existing subordinate RSOCs under each of the 
geographic CINCs126 indicate a solid foundation upon which to merge INFOCOM. 
 
                                                 
125 Jeffrey Seinwill, Organizing Joint Forces for Information Operations: The Viability of a Joint 
Force Information Operations Component Commander (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff 
College: 1999) 34. 
126 GlobalSecurity.org, “US Special Operations Command,” 19 March 2002,  
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/socom.htm>. Since 1988 each of the theater unified 
commands have established a separate Special Operations Command (SOC) to meet its theater-unique 
special operations requirements. As subordinate unified commands, the theater SOCs provide the planning, 
preparation, and command and control of SOF from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. They ensure that SOF 
strategic capabilities are fully employed and that SOF are fully synchronized with conventional military 
operations, when applicable.  
Theater SOCs offer several advantages to regional commanders. As peacetime elements, the SOCs are 
the nucleus around which a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) can be structured. They provide a 
clear chain of command for in-theater SOF as well as the staff expertise to plan, conduct, and support joint 
SO in the theater’s area of responsibility. SOCs ensure that SOF personnel fully participate in theater 
mission planning and that theater component commanders are thoroughly familiar with SOF operational 
and support requirements and capabilities. While USCINCSOC provides funding and personnel for the 
SOCs, each SOC reports directly to the geographic CINC.  
SOCs, established as sub-unified commands of the combatant unified commands, are the sources of 
expertise in all areas of special operations, providing the geographic CINCs with a separate element to plan 
and control the employment of joint SOF in military operations. Additionally, SOCs provide the nucleus 
for the establishment of a joint special operations task force (JSOTF), when a joint task force is formed. In 
the author’s opinion, this is the ideal supporting structure for INFOCOM representation in the geographic 
CINCs—replace the term “JSOTF” with “IO cell” and “SOF” and “SO” with “IO.” 
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d. Joint Forces Command 
JFCOM was initially selected due to its mission to maximize the nation’s 
future and present military capabilities through joint concept development and 
experimentation, recommendation of joint requirements, advancing interoperability, 
conducting joint training and providing operationally ready forces and capabilities to 
support the CINCs.127 JFCOMs functional role as the chief advocate for jointness and the 
leader for military transformation, coupled with the fact that five (FIWC, JBC, JCSE, 
JWAC, JWFC) of the fifteen organizations listed in Chapter IV that provide support to IO 
report (directly or indirectly)128 to JFCOM make it the logical choice as the home for 
INFOCOM. 
D. INFOCOM ORGANIZATION 
See figure 8 for visual representation of INFOCOM organization. 
1. Supporting Elements in Place 
· JFCOM provides the broad structure for INFOCOM and the power of an 
in-place 4-star CINC as the major proponent of IO in DoD. 
· Joint Warfare Analysis Center shifts to INFOCOM control; performs 
mission as assigned. 
· Joint C4ISR Battle Center shifts to INFOCOM control; performs mission 
as assigned. 
· Joint Spectrum Center shifts to INFOCOM control; performs mission as 
assigned. 
· Joint Communications Support Element shifts to INFOCOM control; 
performs mission as assigned. 
· Joint Warfighting Center shifts to INFOCOM control; performs mission as 
assigned. 
                                                 
127 US Joint Forces Command, “About JFCOM,” 19 March 2002, 
<http://137.246.33.101/About/about1.htm>.  
128 Note that the JIOC was only recently (October 1999) assigned to SPACECOM. Prior to that date, 
JIOC (then Joint Command and Control Warfare (C2W) Center) was a subordinate command of JFCOM 
(then Atlantic Command). 
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2. Realigned Elements 
· Joint Information Operations Center relocates to JFCOM and is 
redesignated INFOCOM. JIOC brings a 2-star commander to act as 
CINCINFO under CINCJFCOM. 
· JTF-CNO realigns with control of CERTs to form Joint Computer Support 
Activity (JCSA). Remains geographically stationary to leverage support of 
co-located IO organizations (Air Intelligence Agency, Air Force 
Information Warfare Center and Air Force IW Battlelab). Closely 
coordinates service IW centers and provides a forum for sharing lessons 
learned. Establishes liaison with NIPC. 
· US Army Civil Affairs and PSYOP Command relocates and transforms 
into Joint PSYOP Command (JPOC) with PSYOP and CA units. JPOC 
Commander is designated Deputy INFOCOM. Maintains 2-star rank to 
enforce the balance between IO art and IO science. Art and science 
interests rotate as Commander INFOCOM to further maintain the 
art/science balance.   
· Joint COMSEC Monitoring Agency realigns to INFOCOM control. 
3. New Elements Created 
· JTF-IO for each regional CINC. JTF-IO leverages power of the Regional 
SOC concept. See footnote 127.  
4. Elements Remaining under Service Control 
· AFIWC, NIWA, FIWC, and LIWA remain/revert to service control. This 
is intended to keep the services interested in continued development of IO. 
5. Coordination Relationships  
· Joint PSYOP Command and Joint Multi-media Center liaison with IPI 
Core Group. 
· Joint Computer Support Agency liaison with FBI National Infrastructure 
Protection Center. INFOCOM will liaison with the Interagency IO 
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the establishment of an Information 
Operations (IO) command and will stimulate further discussion and research of this issue.  
Concepts and definitions of Information Operations are presented to provide the reader a 
common framework of understanding upon which to base further discussion of IO. 
Current organizational structure, doctrine for execution of IO, and how IO supports 
national and military objectives are also presented and shortcomings examined. After 
consideration of several possible solutions a proposed structure for an IO command is 
presented and the feasibility of that structure discussed. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question Answered 
· Is there is a need for an Information Operations organization at the joint 
military strategic (unified command) level to integrate, coordinate, 
deconflict, and synchronize information activities within the Department 
of Defense? 
There is a need for an Information Operations organization at the joint military 
strategic (unified command) level to integrate coordinate, deconflict, and synchronize 
information activities within the Department of Defense. Support for this argument is 
provided in chapter V. 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions Answered 
· What is IO? 
The concepts of IO and joint definitions of IO were presented in chapter II. 
· How does IO support National Objectives? 
The process of developing the National Military Strategy from the guidance 
contained in the National Security Strategy, and the relationship of IO to both national 
and military objectives was discussed in chapter III.  
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· What is the problem with current IO doctrine? 
The problems with IO doctrine were discussed in chapter V. 
· What is the feasibility of creating the proposed IO organization? 
A list of organizations that support IO was provided in chapter IV. Chapter V 
discussed the realignment of these organizations into a notional functional command 
(INFOCOM).  As each of the elements of INFOCOM are currently budgeted and exist 
within the Department of Defense, there will be minimal fiscal outlay needed to establish 
INFOCOM. The realignment of existing organizations is not difficult to accomplish. 
Establishing a subunified command under an existing CINC is far less difficult and costly 
than standing up a new unified commander. 
Hostile armies may face each other for years, 
striving for the victory that is decided in a single day. This 
being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy’s condition, 
simply because one begrudges the outlay of a hundred 
ounces of silver…is the height of inhumanity. –Sun Tzu  
· How should the Information Operations organization be structured? 
The proposed structure for INFOCOM is presented in chapter V. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A need exists to create an organization at the unified command level to integrate, 
coordinate, and synchronize military information activities within the Department of 
Defense.  This organization, the Department of Defense Information Command 
(INFOCOM), would provide the “jumping-off” point to interface with a national-level 
organization for the planning, coordination, and execution of information activities at the 
national strategic level. The capabilities and resources required for INFOCOM are not 
found in any single organization; however, the capabilities do exist within the 
Department of Defense. INFOCOM would be composed of Department of Defense units 
and organizations that analyze, simulate, plan, or conduct information operations. 
Successful implementation of the INFOCOM concept would make IO work in the 
military. Additionally, it would provide encouragement to other US government agencies 
to develop information coordination organizations and develop information strategies. 
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To retain our effectiveness with less redundancy, we will 
need to wring every ounce of capability from every 
available source. That outcome can only be accomplished 
through a more seamless integration of Service capability. 
To achieve this integration while conducting military 
operations we must be fully joint: Institutionally, 
organizationally, intellectually, and technically.129 
The INFOCOM concept is an enabler of this Joint Vision mandate. 
D. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
A more detailed analysis of the proposed INFOCOM structure needs to be 
conducted.  Additionally, the composition of the JTF-IO that would provide IO support to 
the geographic CINCs needs to be explored. 
The concept of information as a national instrument of power was briefly 
discussed in this thesis.130 Possible areas of research on this subject are: (1) The 
implementation and organization of a national organization to wield the information IOP; 
(2) The development of a national information strategy; (3) Is IO just for the military? 
Explore how a non-military government agency (such as the Department of State) would 
employ the information instrument of power (and coordinate with DoD/CINC efforts, as 
applicable). 
E. FINAL THOUGHTS 
The United States possesses the world’s finest information technology. US 
doctrine for IO is flawed only in that it is reliant on an organizational structure that does 
not yet exist. If existing forces can be realigned to support the existing doctrine it may 
well ignite a Revolution in Military Affairs. 
Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in 
the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt 
themselves after the changes occur….Those nations who 
are caught unprepared for the coming war will find, when 
war breaks out, not only that it is too late for them to get 
ready for it, but that they cannot even get the drift of it.131 
 
                                                 
129 Shalikashvili, 8-9. 
130 The author was exposed to the national information strategy by Dr. Dan Kuehl, an instructor in the 
Information Resources Management College at National Defense University. E-mail: kuehld@ndu.edu 















































APPENDIX A: ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
AIS   automated information systems 
AOR   area of responsibility 
C2   command and control 
C2W   command and control warfare 
C4   command, control, communications, and computers 
C4I   command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence 
CA   civil affairs 
CERT   computer emergency response team 
CI     counterintelligence 
CMO   civil-military operations 
CNA  computer network attack 
CND  computer network defense 
CNE  computer network exploitation 
CNO  computer network operations 
COA   course of action 
COMPUSEC  computer security 
COMSEC  communications security 
CONPLAN  operation plan in concept format 
DIA   Defense Intelligence Agency 
DII   Defense Information Infrastructure 
DISA   Defense Information Systems Agency 
DOD   Department of Defense 
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DODD  Department of Defense Directive 
EA   electronic attack 
EEFI   essential elements of friendly information 
EP   electronic protection 
EPW   enemy prisoner of war 
ES   electronic warfare support 
EW   electronic warfare 
FDO   flexible deterrent option 
FHA   foreign humanitarian assistance 
GII   global information infrastructure 
HN   host nation 
HUMINT  human intelligence 
I&W   indications and warning 
IA   information assurance 
INFOSEC  information security 
IO   information operations 
IPB   intelligence preparation of the battlespace 
IW   information warfare 
J-2   Intelligence Directorate of a joint staff 
J-3   Operations Directorate of a joint staff 
J-4   Logistics Directorate of a joint staff 
J-5   Plans Directorate of a joint staff 
J-6   C4I Systems Directorate of a joint staff 
J-7   Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate of a joint staff 
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JC2WC  Joint Command and Control Warfare Center 
JCCC   Joint communications control center 
JCMA   Joint COMSEC (communications security) Monitoring Activity 
JCSE   Joint Communications Support Element 
JFC   Joint force commander 
JFCOM  Joint Forces Command 
JIB   Joint Information Bureau 
JOA   joint operations area 
JOC   joint operations center 
JOPES  Joint Operation Planning and Execution System 
JPG   joint planning group 
JPO-STC  Joint Program Office for Special Technology Countermeasures 
JPOTF  joint psychological operations task force 
JRFL   joint restricted frequency list 
JSC   Joint Spectrum Center 
JTCB   joint targeting coordination board 
JTF   joint task force 
JWAC  Joint Warfare Analysis Center 
LOC   line of communications 
M&S   modeling and simulation 
MOOTW  military operations other than war 
NGO   nongovernmental organization 
NII   National Information Infrastructure 
NSA   National Security Agency 
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OPFOR  opposition force 
OPLAN  operation plan 
OPORD  operation order 
OPSEC  operations security 
PA   public affairs 
PSYOP  psychological operations 
ROE   rules of engagement 
SIO   special information operations 
SOCOM Special Operations Command 
SOF   special operations forces 
USG   United States Government 
USIA   United States Information Agency 
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APPENDIX B: IO DEFINITIONS 
civil affairs. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit 
relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and 
nongovernmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of 
operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. 
Civil affairs may include performance by military forces of activities and functions 
normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may occur prior to, 
during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the 
absence of other military operations. Also called CA. (Joint Pub 1-02) 
command and control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly 
designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the 
mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of 
personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a 
commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in 
the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (Joint Pub 1-02) 
command and control warfare. The integrated use of operations security, military 
deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and physical destruction, 
mutually supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy 
adversary command and control capabilities, while protecting friendly command and 
control capabilities against such actions. Command and control warfare is an application 
of information operations in military operations. Also called C2W. C2W is both offensive 
and defensive:  
a. C2-attack. Prevent effective C2 of adversary forces by denying information to, 
influencing, degrading, or destroying the adversary C2 system.  
b. C2-protect. Maintain effective command and control of own forces by turning to 
friendly advantage or negating adversary efforts to deny information to, influence, 
degrade, or destroy the friendly C2 system. (This term and its definition modifies the 
existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint 
Pub 1-02.) 
communications security. The protection resulting from all measures designed to deny 
unauthorized persons information of value which might be derived from the possession 
and study of telecommunications, or to mislead unauthorized persons in their 
interpretation of the results of such possession and study. Also called COMSEC. 
Communications security includes cryptosecurity, transmission security, emission 
security, and physical security of communications security materials and information.  
a. cryptosecurity — The component of communications security that results from the 
provision of technically sound cryptosystems and their proper use.  
b. transmission security — The component of communications security that results from 
all measures designed to protect transmissions from interception and exploitation by 
means other than cryptanalysis.  
c. emission security — The component of communications security that results from all 
measures taken to deny unauthorized persons information of value that might be derived 
from intercept and analysis of compromising emanations from crypto-equipment and 
telecommunications systems.  
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d. physical security — The component of communications security that results from all 
physical measures necessary to safeguard classified equipment, material, and documents 
from access thereto or observation thereof by unauthorized persons. (Joint Pub 1-02) 
computer network attack. Operations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information 
resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks 
themselves. Also called CNA. (Joint Pub 3-13) 
computer network defense. Defensive measures to protect and defend information, 
computers, and networks from disruption, denial, degradation, or destruction. Also called 
CND. (Joint Pub 3-13) 
counter-deception. Efforts to negate, neutralize, diminish the effects of, or gain 
advantage from, a foreign deception operation. Counter-deception does not include the 
intelligence function of identifying foreign deception operations.(Joint Pub 1-02) 
counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against 
espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on 
behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign 
persons, or international terrorist activities. Also called CI. (Joint Pub 1-02) 
deception. Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, 
distortion, 
or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. 
(Joint Pub 1-02) 
defensive information operations. The integration and coordination of policies and 
procedures, operations, personnel, and technology to protect and defend information and 
information systems. Defensive information operations are conducted through 
information assurance, physical security, operations security, counter-deception, counter 
psychological operations, counterintelligence, electronic warfare, and special information 
operations. Defensive information operations ensure timely, accurate, and relevant 
information access while denying adversaries the opportunity to exploit friendly 
information and information systems for their own purposes. (Joint Pub 3-13) 
electronic warfare. Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and 
directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Also 
called EW. The three major subdivisions within electronic warfare are: electronic attack, 
electronic protection, and electronic warfare support.  
a. electronic attack. That division of electronic warfare involving the use of 
electromagnetic, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, 
or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat 
capability. Also called EA. EA includes:  
1) actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the 
electromagnetic spectrum, such as jamming and electromagnetic deception, and  
2) employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed energy as 
their primary destructive mechanism (lasers, radio frequency weapons, particle beams, or 
antiradiation weapons).  
b. electronic protection. That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to 
protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy 
employment of electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat 
capability. Also called EP.  
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c. electronic warfare support. That division of electronic warfare involving actions tasked 
by, or under direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, 
and locate sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for 
the purpose of immediate threat recognition. Thus, electronic warfare support provides 
information required for immediate decisions involving electronic warfare operations and 
other tactical actions such as threat avoidance, targeting, and homing. Also called ES. 
Electronic warfare support data can be used to produce signals intelligence, both 
communications intelligence, and electronic intelligence. (Joint Pub 1-02) 
information. 1. Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form. 2. The 
meaning that 
a human assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their 
representation. (Joint Pub 1-02) 
information assurance. Information operations that protect and defend information and 
information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. This includes providing for restoration of 
information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. 
Also called IA. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next 
edition of Joint Pub 1-02.) 
information operations. Actions taken to affect adversary information and information 
systems while defending one’s own information and information systems. Also 
called IO. (Joint Pub 3-13) 
information superiority. That degree of dominance in the information domain which 
permits the conduct of operations without effective opposition. (JV2010) 
information system. The entire infrastructure, organization, personnel, and 
components that collect, process, store, transmit, display, disseminate, and act on 
information. 
(Joint Pub 3-13) 
information warfare. Information operations conducted during time of crisis or 
conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or 
adversaries. Also called IW. (Joint Pub 3-13) 
offensive information operations. The integrated use of assigned and supporting 
capabilities and activities, mutually supported by intelligence, to affect adversary 
decision makers to achieve or promote specific objectives. These capabilities and 
activities include, but are not limited to, operations security, military deception, 
psychological operations, electronic warfare, physical attack and/or destruction, 
and special information operations, and could include computer network attack. 
(Joint 
Pub 3-13.) 
operations security. A process of identifying critical information and subsequently 
analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to:  
a. Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems.  
b. Determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted 
or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries.  
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c. Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the 
vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC. (Joint 
Pub 1-02) 
physical security. That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to 
safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, 
material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, 
damage, and theft. (Joint Pub 1-02) 
psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and 
indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, 
and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and 
individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce 
foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called 
PSYOP. (Joint Pub 1-02) 
public affairs. Those public information, command information, and community 
relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in 
the Department of Defense. Also called PA. (Joint Pub 1-02) 
special information operations. Information operations that by their sensitive nature, 
due to their potential effect or impact, security requirements, or risk to the national 
security of the United States, require a special review and approval process. Also called 
SIO. (Joint Pub 3-13.) 
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APPENDIX C: NATIONAL MILITARY STRUCTURE 
PRESIDENT 
Ultimate authority and responsibility for the national defense rests with the 
President, as directed by the Constitution. 
National Command Authority. 
National Command Authorities (NCA)132 are the President and Secretary of 
Defense together with their duly deputized alternates or successors.  “NCA” is used to 
signify Constitutional authority to direct the armed forces in execution of military action.  
Inter-theater movement of troops and execution of military action must be, by law, 
directed by NCA.  No one else in the chain of command has authority to direct such 
action. 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) 
World War II and its aftermath furnished the impetus for unification of the 
Military Departments under a single cabinet-level secretary. Anticipating the needs of a 
peacetime military organization, an in-depth review by congressional, executive, and 
military groups began even before the end of the war. The studies were influenced by 
Service interests that reflected the opinions of experienced wartime military and civilian 
leaders with vastly different views of the postwar future. Issues that dominated the search 
for a consensus included retention of air power in the Navy, maintenance of a separate 
Marine Corps, and the form and responsibilities of the new Department of the Air Force.  
The Secretary of Defense 
The Secretary of Defense is an executive cabinet level Presidential appointee 
heading the Department of Defense. The DOD Reorganization Act of 1958 and the 
Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 strengthened the Secretary of 
Defense’s direction, authority, and control over the department and clarified the 
operational chain of command from the President and Secretary of Defense to the 
combatant commanders. The Secretary of Defense is the principal assistant to the 
President for all matters relating to the Department of Defense with nearly plenary 
authority, direction, and control of the entire department.  
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is senior ranking member of the 
armed forces and the principal military adviser to the President, Secretary of Defense, 
and the National Security Council (NSC). The CJCS plans and coordinates actions 
involving the armed forces of the United States with the advice and support of the heads 
of the military departments. 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) consist of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman, the 
Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Air 
                                                 
132 Per JCS Memorandum MCM-0003-02 dtd. 11 January 2002 the Secretary of Defense directed that 
use of the term “National Command Authorities” be discontinued. Instead, refer specifically to the 
“President” or “Secretary of Defense,” or both, as appropriate. 
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Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. All JCS members are by law military 
advisers, and they may respond to a request or voluntarily submit, through the Chairman, 
advice or opinions to the President, the Secretary of Defense, or NSC. The Joint Chiefs of 
Staff have no executive authority to command combatant forces.  
MILITARY DEPARTMENTS 
The Military Departments (Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, 
Department of the Air Force) are organized separately under civilian secretaries who are 
responsible for and have authority to conduct the affairs committed to their departments.  
The Secretaries of the Military Departments assign all forces to combatant commands 
except those assigned to carry out the mission of the Services, i.e., recruit, organize, 
supply, equip, train, service, mobilize, demobilize, administer and maintain their 
respective forces The service secretaries are not in the operational chain of command (see 
Figure 14). 
Department of the Navy 
The U.S. Navy is the nation’s forward deployed force and acts as a major 
deterrent to aggression around the world. Naval forces stand ready to provide a quick 
response to any crisis world-wide. 
Department of the Army 
The mission of the Army is to defend the land mass of the United States and its 
territories, commonwealths and possessions and overcome any aggressor that imperils 
our nation’s peace and security. 
Department of the Air Force 
The mission of the Air Force is to defend the United States through control and 
exploitation of air and space. The Air Force provides the nation a rapid, flexible, and 
when necessary, a lethal air and space capability. It can deliver forces anywhere in the 
world in less than 48 hours. 
THE UNIFIED COMMANDS 
The Secretary of Defense exercises his authority over how the military is trained 
and equipped through the Service secretaries; but uses a totally different method to 
exercise his authority to deploy troops and exercise military power. This latter authority 
is directed, with the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to his nine 
unified combatant commands, whose commanders-in-chief are commonly referred to as 
the “CINCs.”  
The unified command structure is flexible; it changes as required to meet evolving 
national security needs. A classified document called the Unified Command Plan (UCP) 
establishes the combatant commands, identifies geographic areas of responsibility, 
assigns primary tasks, defines authority of the commanders, establishes command 
relationships, and gives guidance on the exercise of combatant command. It is approved 
by the President, published by the CJCS, and addressed to the commanders of combatant 
commands. 
The CINCs have direct links to both the President and Secretary of Defense. Five 






The Central Command (CENTCOM) oversees the balance of the Mid-East, parts 




Figure 9.   CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (From: http://www.defenselink.mil) 
 
European Command 
The European Command (EUCOM) is responsible for all U.S. military activities 
in Europe, most of Africa and Israel, Lebanon and Syria, and the South Atlantic Ocean 




Figure 10.   EUCOM Area of Responsibility (From: http://www.defenselink.mil) 
 
Joint Forces Command 
The Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) protects U.S. interests in the North Atlantic 
Ocean, Arctic Ocean and Greenland (see Figure 11). In addition, it has worldwide 
responsibility for joint warfighting training and provides military support to weapons of 






Figure 11.   JFCOM Area of Responsibility (From: http://www.defenselink.mil) 
 
Pacific Command 
The Pacific Command (PACOM) covers 50 percent of the Earth’s surface 




Figure 12.   PACOM Area of Responsibility (From: http://www.defenselink.mil) 
 
Southern Command 
The Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) guards U.S. interests in the southern 





Figure 13.   SOUTHCOM Areas of Responsibility (From: http://www.defenselink.mil) 
 
Space Command 
The Space Command (SPACECOM) launches and operates satellites, supports 
joint-service military forces worldwide with intelligence, communications, weather, 
navigation, and ballistic missile attack warning information, engages adversaries from 
space, assures U.S. access to and operation in space, and deny enemies that same 
freedom.  
Special Operations Command 
The Special Operations Command (SOCOM) provides counter-paramilitary, 
counter-narcotics, guerilla, psychological warfare, civil education, and insurgency 
capability in support of US national and international interests.  
Strategic Command 
The Strategic Command (STRATCOM) deters conventional and nuclear attack on 
the U.S. and its allies. Its forces include land-based and sea-based nuclear assets. If 




The Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) is responsible for moving things 
and people around the world, specifically providing air, land and sea transportation for 
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APPENDIX D: IO CELL MEMBERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
The size and composition of the IO cell is determined by the scope of the 
operation. The following is a discussion of a “typical” cell and brief discussions of the 
duties of those assigned. 
The CJTF normally assigns responsibilities for IO to the Operations Officer (J3).  
To assist the J3 in exercising Joint IO responsibilities, the J3 may also appoint an IO 
officer.  The primary function of the IO officer is to supervise the IO cell, ensuring 
capabilities and activities are planned, coordinated, and integrated within the JTF staff 
and with higher echelon, adjacent, subordinate, and multinational staffs.  The IO officer 
is responsible for ensuring that IO is implemented per the CJTFs guidance.  Some of the 
generic functions of the IO officer and select IO cell members are listed below. 
IO Officer 
Ø Coordinates the overall IO effort for the CJTF. 
Ø Coordinates IO issues within the JTF Headquarters (HQs) and counterpart 
IO planners on the component staffs. 
Ø Coordinates IO defensive and offensive concepts to support the CJTFs 
concept of operations. 
Ø Establishes IO priorities to accomplish planned objectives. 
Ø Determines the availability of IO resources to carry out IO plans. 
Ø Recommends tasking to the J3 for Joint organizations, which plan and 
supervise the various capabilities and related activities to be utilized.  
Consolidated J3 tasking ensures efficiency of effort in planning and 
executing integrated IO. 
Ø Serves as a member of the JTFs Joint Targeting Coordination Board 
(JTCB), acting as the primary advocate for IO targeting. 
Ø Serves as a member of the JTFs Joint Planning Group (JPG), coordinating 
the planning and execution of IO activities throughout the JTF. 
Ø Coordinates intelligence support to IO. 
Ø Coordinates IO inputs from Joint centers and agencies. 
Ø Coordinates liaison with Joint activities that support the JTFs IO efforts. 
Joint Intelligence (J2) Representative coordinates collection requirements and 
analytical support for compartmented and non-compartmented IO.  This support could 
include an analysis of the adversary IO threat; IO related Indications and Warnings 
(I&W); adversary nodal and Command and Control (C2) analysis; Joint Intelligence 
Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB) support; Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) and 
measures of effectiveness (MOE).  Represents the IO cell on the Intelligence Collection 
Synchronization Board (ICSB).  
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Joint Plans and Policy (J5) Representative integrates IO into the crisis action 
and deliberate planning processes and provides policy advice as appropriate. 
Joint Communications (J6) Representative facilitates Information Assurance 
(IA) coordination between information system planners, managers, and members of the 
IO cell. The J6 representative is the principle liaison with the Joint Communications 
Control Center (JCCC) and coordinates information system support to the IO cell.  The 
J6 representative may serve as the Joint COMSEC (Communications Security) 
Monitoring Activity (JCMA) point of entry into the staff. 
Joint Training J7 Representative or J3 Training Planner oversees IO training 
for the JTF staff. 
Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Representative integrates, coordinates, 
deconflicts, and synchronizes the use of PSYOP.  Serves as the entry point for liaison 
from Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) and the in-theater PSYOP 
cells. 
Electronic Warfare (EW) Representative coordinates EW activities and serves 
as Joint Spectrum Center (JSC) liaison officer. 
Public Affairs (PA) Representative coordinates and deconflicts PA activities 
with planned IO. 
Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) Representative advises planners to ensure IO is in 
compliance with domestic and international laws. 
Civil Affairs (CA) Planner ensures consistency of CA activities that may 
support IO. 
Targeting Representative represents the targeting cell(s) and coordinates IO 
targeting with the JTCB, if designated.  
Component Representatives ensure that component activities are consistent with 
the JTF Commander’s Intent and guidance. 
Special Technical Operations (STO) Billets.  Members of the IO Cell 
possessing the proper security clearance and access integrate compartmented capabilities 
into plans.  Normally the IO cell is the appropriate entity to conduct this integration.  In 
addition, the IO cell has the connectivity to higher authority for plan approval associated 
with compartmented operations.  Close coordination between the JTF IO cell and the 
CINCs STO cell is essential to this integration effort. 
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APPENDIX E: PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE 56 
(MANAGING COMPLEX CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS) 
WHITE PAPER 
The Clinton Administration’s Policy on 
Managing Complex Contingency Operations: 




This White Paper explains key elements of the Clinton Administration’s policy on 
managing complex contingency operations. This unclassified document is promulgated 
for use by government officials as a handy reference for inter-agency planning of future 
complex contingency operations. Also, it is intended for use in U.S. Government 
professional education institutions, such as the National Defense University and the 
National Foreign Affairs Training Center, for coursework and exercises on inter-agency 
practices and procedures. Regarding this paper’s utility as representation of the 
President’s Directive, it contains all the key elements of the original PDD that are needed 
for effective implementation by agency officials. Therefore, wide dissemination of this 
unclassified White Paper is encouraged by all agencies of the U.S. Government. Note that 
while this White Paper explains the PDD, it does not override the official PDD.  
Background 
In the wake of the Cold War, attention has focused on a rising number of territorial 
disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, and civil wars that pose threats to regional and 
international peace and may be accompanied by natural or manmade disasters which 
precipitate massive human suffering. We have learned that effective responses to these 
situations may require multi-dimensional operations composed of such components as 
political/diplomatic, humanitarian, intelligence, economic development, and security: 
hence the term complex contingency operations.  
The PDD defines “complex contingency operations” as peace operations such as the 
peace accord implementation operation conducted by NATO in Bosnia (1995-present) 
and the humanitarian intervention in northern Iraq called Operation Provide Comfort 
(1991); and foreign humanitarian assistance operations, such as Operation Support Hope 
in central Africa (1994) and Operation Sea Angel in Bangladesh (1991). Unless 
otherwise directed, this PDD does not apply to domestic disaster relief or to relatively 
routine or small-scale operations, nor to military operations conducted in defense of U.S. 
citizens, territory, or property, including counter-terrorism and hostage-rescue operations 
and international armed conflict.  
In recent situations as diverse as Haiti, Somalia, Northern Iraq, and the former 
Yugoslavia, the United States has engaged in complex contingency operations in 
coalition, either under the auspices of an international or regional organization or in ad 
hoc, temporary coalitions of like-minded states. While never relinquishing the capability 
to respond unilaterally, the PDD assumes that the U.S. will continue to conduct future 
operations in coalition whenever possible.  
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We must also be prepared to manage the humanitarian, economic and political 
consequences of a technological crisis where chemical, biological, and/or radiological 
hazards may be present. The occurrence of any one of these dimensions could 
significantly increase the sensitivity and complexity of a U.S. response to a technological 
crisis.  
In many complex emergencies the appropriate U.S. Government response will incur the 
involvement of only non-military assets. In some situations, we have learned that military 
forces can quickly affect the dynamics of the situation and may create the conditions 
necessary to make significant progress in mitigating or resolving underlying conflict or 
dispute. However, we have also learned that many aspects of complex emergencies may 
not be best addressed through military measures. Furthermore, given the level of U.S. 
interests at stake in most of these situations, we recognize that U.S. forces should not be 
deployed in an operation indefinitely.  
It is essential that the necessary resources be provided to ensure that we are prepared to 
respond in a robust, effective manner. To foster a durable peace or stability in these 
situations and to maximize the effect of judicious military deployments, the civilian 
components of an operation must be integrated closely with the military components.  
While agencies of government have developed independent capacities to respond to 
complex emergencies, military and civilian agencies should operate in a synchronized 
manner through effective inter-agency management and the use of special mechanisms to 
coordinate agency efforts. Integrated planning and effective management of agency 
operations early on in an operation can avoid delays, reduce pressure on the military to 
expand its involvement in unplanned ways, and create unity of effort within an operation 
that is essential for success of the mission. 
Intent of the PDD  
The need for complex contingency operations is likely to recur in future years, 
demanding varying degrees of U.S. involvement. The PDD calls for all U.S. Government 
agencies to institutionalize what we have learned from our recent experiences and to 
continue the process of improving the planning and management of complex contingency 
operations. The PDD is designed to ensure that the lessons learned—including proven 
planning processes and implementation mechanisms—will be incorporated into the inter-
agency process on a regular basis. The PDDs intent is to establish these management 
practices to achieve unity of effort among U.S. Government agencies and international 
organizations engaged in complex contingency operations. Dedicated mechanisms and 
integrated planning processes are needed. From our recent experiences, we have learned 
that these can help to: 
· identify appropriate missions and tasks, if any, for U.S. 
Government agencies in a U.S. Government response;  
· develop strategies for early resolution of crises, thereby 
minimizing the loss of life and establishing the basis for 
reconciliation and reconstruction;  
· accelerate planning and implementation of the civilian aspects of 
the operation;  
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· intensify action on critical funding and personnel requirements 
early on;  
· integrate all components of a U.S. response (civilian, military, 
police, etc.) at the policy level and facilitate the creation of 
coordination mechanisms at the operational level; and  
· rapidly identify issues for senior policy makers and ensure 
expeditious implementation of decisions.  
The PDD requires all agencies to review their legislative and budget authorities for 
supporting complex contingency operations and, where such authorities are inadequate to 
fund an agency’s mission and operations in complex contingencies, propose legislative 
and budgetary solutions.  
Executive Committee  
The PDD calls upon the Deputies Committee to establish appropriate inter-agency 
working groups to assist in policy development, planning, and execution of complex 
contingency operations. Normally, the Deputies Committee will form an Executive 
Committee (ExCom) with appropriate membership to supervise the day-to-day 
management of U.S. participation in a complex contingency operation. The ExCom will 
bring together representatives of all agencies that might participate in the operation, 
including those not normally part of the NSC structure. When this is the case, both the 
Deputies Committee and the ExCom will normally be augmented by participating agency 
representatives. In addition, the chair of the ExCom will normally designate an agency to 
lead a legal and fiscal advisory sub-group, whose role is to consult with the ExCom to 
ensure that tasks assigned by the ExCom can be performed by the assigned agencies 
consistent with legal and fiscal authorities. This ExCom approach has proved useful in 
clarifying agency responsibilities, strengthening agency accountability, ensuring inter-
agency coordination, and developing policy options for consideration by senior policy 
makers.  
The guiding principle behind the ExCom approach to inter-agency management is the 
personal accountability of presidential appointees. Members of the ExCom effectively 
serve as functional managers for specific elements of the U.S. Government response 
(e.g., refugees, demobilization, elections, economic assistance, police reform, public 
information, etc.). They implement the strategies agreed to by senior policy makers in the 
inter-agency and report to the ExCom and Deputies Committee on any problems or issues 
that need to be resolved.  
In future complex contingency operations to which the United States contributes 
substantial resources, the PDD calls upon the Deputies Committee to establish 
organizational arrangements akin to those of the ExCom approach.  
The Political-Military Implementation Plan  
The PDD requires that a political-military implementation plan (or “pol-mil plan”) be 
developed as an integrated planning tool for coordinating U.S. government actions in a 
complex contingency operation. The pol-mil plan will include a comprehensive situation 
assessment, mission statement, agency objectives, and desired endstate. It will outline an 
integrated concept of operations to synchronize agency efforts. The plan will identify the 
primary preparatory issues and tasks for conducting an operation (e.g., congressional 
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consultations, diplomatic efforts, troop recruitment, legal authorities, funding 
requirements and sources, media coordination, etc.). It will also address major functional 
/ mission area tasks (e.g., political mediation / reconciliation, military support, 
demobilization, humanitarian assistance, police reform, basic public services, economic 
restoration, human rights monitoring, social reconciliation, public information, etc.). 
(Annex A contains an illustrative outline of a pol-mil plan.)  
With the use of the pol-mil plan, the inter-agency can implement effective management 
practices, namely, to centralize planning and decentralize execution during the operation. 
The desired unity of effort among the various agencies that is created through the use of 
the pol-mil plan contributes to the overall success of these complex operations.  
When a complex contingency operation is contemplated in which the U.S. Government 
will play a substantial role, the PDD calls upon the Deputies Committee to task the 
development of a pol-mil plan and assign specific responsibilities to the \appropriate 
ExCom officials.  
Each ExCom official will be required to develop their respective part of the plan, which 
will be fully coordinated among all relevant agencies. This development process will be 
transparent and analytical, resulting in issues being posed to senior policy makers for 
resolution. Based on the resulting decisions, the plan will be finalized and widely 
distributed among relevant agencies. 
The PDD also requires that the pol-mil plan include demonstrable milestones and 
measures of success including detailed planning for the transition of the operation to 
activities which might be performed by a follow-on operation or by the host government. 
According to the PDD, the pol-mil plan should be updated as the mission progresses to 
reflect milestones that are (or are not) met and to incorporate changes in the situation on 
the ground.  
Inter-agency Pol-Mil Plan Rehearsal  
A critical aspect of the planning process will be the inter-agency rehearsal/review of the 
pol-mil plan. As outlined in the PDD, this activity involves a rehearsal of the plan’s main 
elements, with the appropriate ExCom official presenting the elements for which he or 
she is responsible. By simultaneously rehearsing/reviewing all elements of the plan, 
differences over mission objectives, agency responsibilities, timing/synchronization, and 
resource allocation can be identified and resolved early, preferably before the operation 
begins. The inter-agency rehearsal/review also underscores the accountability of each 
program manager in implementing their assigned area of responsibility. During 
execution, regular reviews of the plan ensure that milestones are met and that appropriate 
adjustments are made.  
The PDD calls upon the Deputies Committee to conduct the inter-agency 
rehearsal/review of the pol-mil plan. Supporting agency plans are to be presented by 
ExCom officials before a complex contingency operation is launched (or as early as 
possible once the operation begins), before a subsequent critical phase during the 
operation, as major changes in the mission occur, and prior to an operation’s termination.  
After-Action Review  
After the conclusion of each operation in which this planning process is employed, the 
PDD directs the ExCom to charter an after-action review involving both those who 
participated in the operation and Government experts who monitored its execution. This 
comprehensive assessment of inter-agency performance will include a review of inter-
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agency planning and coordination, (both in Washington and in the field), legal and 
budgetary difficulties encountered, problems in agency execution, as well as proposed 
solutions, in order to capture lessons learned and to ensure their dissemination to relevant 
agencies.  
Training  
The U.S. Government requires the capacity to prepare agency officials for the 
responsibilities they will be expected to take on in a planning and managing agency 
efforts in a complex contingency operation. Creating a cadre of professionals familiar 
with this integrated planning process will improve the USG’s ability to manage future 
operations. 
In the interest of advancing the expertise of government officials, agencies are 
encouraged to disseminate the Handbook for Inter-agency Management of Complex 
Contingency Operations published by OASD(S&R) Strategy at (703) 614-0421. 
With the support of the State and Defense Departments, the PDD requires the NSC to 
work with the appropriate U.S. Government educational institutions—including the 
National Defense University, the National Foreign Affairs Training Center and the Army 
War College—to develop and conduct an inter-agency training program. This program, 
which should be held at least annually, will train mid-level managers (Deputy Assistant 
Secretary level) in the development and implementation of pol-mil plans for complex 
contingency operations. Those participating should have an opportunity to interact with 
expert officials from previous operations to learn what has worked in the past. Also, the 
PDD calls upon appropriate U.S. government educational institutions to explore the 
appropriate way to incorporate the pol-mil planning process into their curricula.  
Agency Review and Implementation  
Finally, the PDD directs each agency to review the adequacy of their agency’s structure, 
legal authorities, budget levels, personnel system, training, and crisis management 
procedures to insure that we, as a government, are learning from our experiences with 
complex contingency operations and institutionalizing the lessons learned. 
Annex A: Illustrative Components of a Political-Military Plan for a Complex 
Contingency Operation 
· Situation Assessment. A comprehensive assessment of the 
situation to clarify essential information that, in the aggregate, 
provides a multi-dimensional picture of the crisis.  
· U.S. Interests. A statement of U.S. interests at stake in the crisis 
and the requirement to secure those interests.  
· Mission Statement. A clear statement of the USG’s strategic 
purpose for the operation and the pol-mil mission.  
· Objectives. The key civil-military objectives to be accomplished 
during the operation.  
· Desired Pol-Mil End State. The conditions the operation is 
intended to create before the operation transitions to a follow-on 
operation and/or terminates.  
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· Concept of the Operation. A conceptual description of how the 
various instruments of USG policy will be integrated to get the job 
done throughout all phases of the operation.  
· Lead Agency Responsibilities. An assignment of responsibilities 
for participating agencies.  
· Transition/Exit Strategy. A strategy that is linked to the realization 
of the end state described above, requiring the integrated efforts of 
diplomats, military leaders, and relief officials of the USG and the 
international community.  
· Organizational Concept. A schematic of the various organizational 
structures of the operation, in Washington and in theater, including 
a description of the chain of authority and associated reporting 
channels.  
· Preparatory Tasks. A layout of specific tasks to be undertaken 
before the operation begins (congressional consultations, 
diplomatic efforts, troop recruitment, legal authorities, funding 
requirements and sources, media coordination, etc.).  
· Functional or Mission Area Tasks / Agency Plans. Key operational 
and support plans written by USG agencies that pertain to critical 
parts of the operation (e.g., political mediation/reconciliation, 
military support, demobilization, humanitarian assistance, police 
reform, basic public services, economic restoration, human rights 
monitoring, social reconciliation, public information, etc.).  
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APPENDIX F: PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE 63 
(CRITITAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION) 
WHITE PAPER 
The Clinton Administration’s Policy on 
Critical Infrastructure Protection: 
Presidential Decision Directive 63 
May 22, 1998 
 
This White Paper explains key elements of the Clinton Administration’s policy on critical 
infrastructure protection. It is intended for dissemination to all interested parties in both 
the private and public sectors. It will also be used in U.S. Government professional 
education institutions, such as the National Defense University and the National Foreign 
Affairs Training Center, for coursework and exercises on inter-agency practices and 
procedures. Wide dissemination of this unclassified White Paper is encouraged by all 
agencies of the U.S. Government. 
I. A Growing Potential Vulnerability 
The United States possesses both the world’s strongest military and its largest national 
economy. Those two aspects of our power are mutually reinforcing and dependent. They 
are also increasingly reliant upon certain critical infrastructures and upon cyber-based 
information systems.  
Critical infrastructures are those physical and cyber-based systems essential to the 
minimum operations of the economy and government. They include, but are not limited 
to, telecommunications, energy, banking and finance, transportation, water systems and 
emergency services, both governmental and private. Many of the nation’s critical 
infrastructures have historically been physically and logically separate systems that had 
little interdependence. As a result of advances in information technology and the 
necessity of improved efficiency, however, these infrastructures have become 
increasingly automated and interlinked. These same advances have created new 
vulnerabilities to equipment failures, human error, weather and other natural causes, and 
physical and cyber attacks. Addressing these vulnerabilities will necessarily require 
flexible, evolutionary approaches that span both the public and private sectors, and 
protect both domestic and international security.  
Because of our military strength, future enemies, whether nations, groups or individuals, 
may seek to harm us in non-traditional ways including attacks within the United States. 
Our economy is increasingly reliant upon interdependent and cyber-supported 
infrastructures and nontraditional attacks on our infrastructure and information systems 
may be capable of significantly harming both our military power and our economy. 
 
II. President’s Intent 
It has long been the policy of the United States to assure the continuity and viability of 
critical infrastructures. President Clinton intends that the United States will take all 
necessary measures to swiftly eliminate any significant vulnerability to both physical and 
cyber attacks on our critical infrastructures, including especially our cyber systems. 
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III. A National Goal 
No later than the year 2000, the United States shall have achieved an initial operating 
capability and no later than five years from the day the President signed Presidential 
Decision Directive 63 the United States shall have achieved and shall maintain the ability 
to protect our nation’s critical infrastructures from intentional acts that would 
significantly diminish the abilities of: 
· the Federal Government to perform essential national security missions and to ensure 
the general public health and safety; 
· state and local governments to maintain order and to deliver minimum essential public 
services; 
· the private sector to ensure the orderly functioning of the economy and the delivery of 
essential telecommunications, energy, financial and transportation services. Any 
interruptions or manipulations of these critical functions must be brief, infrequent, 
manageable, geographically isolated and minimally detrimental to the welfare of the 
United States. 
IV. A Public-Private Partnership to Reduce Vulnerability 
Since the targets of attacks on our critical infrastructure would likely include both 
facilities in the economy and those in the government, the elimination of our potential 
vulnerability requires a closely coordinated effort of both the public and the private 
sector. To succeed, this partnership must be genuine, mutual and cooperative. In seeking 
to meet our national goal to eliminate the vulnerabilities of our critical infrastructure, 
therefore, the U.S. government should, to the extent feasible, seek to avoid outcomes that 
increase government regulation or expand unfounded government mandates to the private 
sector. 
For each of the major sectors of our economy that are vulnerable to infrastructure attack, 
the Federal Government will appoint from a designated Lead Agency a senior officer of 
that agency as the Sector Liaison Official to work with the private sector. Sector Liaison 
Officials, after discussions and coordination with private sector entities of their 
infrastructure sector, will identify a private sector counterpart (Sector Coordinator) to 
represent their sector. 
Together these two individuals and the departments and corporations they represent shall 
contribute to a sectoral National Infrastructure Assurance Plan by: 
· assessing the vulnerabilities of the sector to cyber or physical attacks; 
· recommending a plan to eliminate significant vulnerabilities; 
· proposing a system for identifying and preventing attempted major attacks; 
· developing a plan for alerting, containing and rebuffing an attack in progress and then, 
in coordination with FEMA as appropriate, rapidly reconstituting minimum essential 
capabilities in the aftermath of an attack. 
During the preparation of the sectoral plans, the National Coordinator (see section VI), in 
conjunction with the Lead Agency Sector Liaison Officials and a representative from the 
National Economic Council, shall ensure their overall coordination and the integration of 
the various sectoral plans, with a particular focus on interdependencies. 
V. Guidelines 
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In addressing this potential vulnerability and the means of eliminating it, President 
Clinton wants those involved to be mindful of the following general principles and 
concerns. 
· We shall consult with, and seek input from, the Congress on approaches and programs 
to meet the objectives set forth in this directive. 
· The protection of our critical infrastructures is necessarily a shared responsibility and 
partnership between owners, operators and the government. Furthermore, the Federal 
Government shall encourage international cooperation to help manage this increasingly 
global problem. 
· Frequent assessments shall be made of our critical infrastructures’ existing reliability, 
vulnerability and threat environment because, as technology and the nature of the threats 
to our critical infrastructures will continue to change rapidly, so must our protective 
measures and responses be robustly adaptive. 
· The incentives that the market provides are the first choice for addressing the problem 
of critical infrastructure protection; regulation will be used only in the face of a material 
failure of the market to protect the health, safety or well-being of the American people. In 
such cases, agencies shall identify and assess available alternatives to direct regulation, 
including providing economic incentives to encourage the desired behavior, or providing 
information upon which choices can be made by the private sector. These incentives, 
along with other actions, shall be designed to help harness the latest technologies, bring 
about global solutions to international problems, and enable private sector owners and 
operators to achieve and maintain the maximum feasible security. 
· The full authorities, capabilities and resources of the government, including law 
enforcement, regulation, foreign intelligence and defense preparedness shall be available, 
as appropriate, to ensure that critical infrastructure protection is achieved and maintained. 
· Care must be taken to respect privacy rights. Consumers and operators must have 
confidence that information will be handled accurately, confidentially and reliably. 
· The Federal Government shall, through its research, development and procurement, 
encourage the introduction of increasingly capable methods of infrastructure protection. 
· The Federal Government shall serve as a model to the private sector on how 
infrastructure assurance is best achieved and shall, to the extent feasible, distribute the 
results of its endeavors. 
· We must focus on preventative measures as well as threat and crisis management. To 
that end, private sector owners and operators should be encouraged to provide maximum 
feasible security for the infrastructures they control and to provide the government 
necessary information to assist them in that task. In order to engage the private sector 
fully, it is preferred that participation by owners and operators in a national infrastructure 
protection system be voluntary. 
· Close cooperation and coordination with state and local governments and first 
responders is essential for a robust and flexible infrastructure protection program. All 
critical infrastructure protection plans and actions shall take into consideration the needs, 
activities and responsibilities of state and local governments and first responders. 
VI. Structure and Organization 
The Federal Government will be organized for the purposes of this endeavor around four 
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components (elaborated in Annex A). 
1.  Lead Agencies for Sector Liaison: For each infrastructure sector that could be a 
target for significant cyber or physical attacks, there will be a single U.S. Government 
department which will serve as the lead agency for liaison. Each Lead Agency will 
designate one individual of Assistant Secretary rank or higher to be the Sector Liaison 
Official for that area and to cooperate with the private sector representatives (Sector 
Coordinators) in addressing problems related to critical infrastructure protection and, in 
particular, in recommending components of the National Infrastructure Assurance Plan. 
Together, the Lead Agency and the private sector counterparts will develop and 
implement a Vulnerability Awareness and Education Program for their sector. 
2.  Lead Agencies for Special Functions: There are, in addition, certain functions 
related to critical infrastructure protection that must be chiefly performed by the Federal 
Government (national defense, foreign affairs, intelligence, law enforcement). For each 
of those special functions, there shall be a Lead Agency which will be responsible for 
coordinating all of the activities of the United States Government in that area. Each lead 
agency will appoint a senior officer of Assistant Secretary rank or higher to serve as the 
Functional Coordinator for that function for the Federal Government. 
3.  Inter-agency Coordination: The Sector Liaison Officials and Functional 
Coordinators of the Lead Agencies, as well as representatives from other relevant 
departments and agencies, including the National Economic Council, will meet to 
coordinate the implementation of this directive under the auspices of a Critical 
Infrastructure Coordination Group (CICG), chaired by the National Coordinator for 
Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism. The National Coordinator will 
be appointed by and report to the President through the Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs, who shall assure appropriate coordination with the Assistant to 
the President for Economic Affairs. Agency representatives to the CICG should be at a 
senior policy level (Assistant Secretary or higher). Where appropriate, the CICG will be 
assisted by extant policy structures, such as the Security Policy Board, Security Policy 
Forum and the National Security and Telecommunications and Information System 
Security Committee. 
4.  National Infrastructure Assurance Council: On the recommendation of the Lead 
Agencies, the National Economic Council and the National Coordinator, the President 
will appoint a panel of major infrastructure providers and state and local government 
officials to serve as the National Infrastructure Assurance Council. The President will 
appoint the Chairman. The National Coordinator will serve as the Council’s Executive 
Director. The National Infrastructure Assurance Council will meet periodically to 
enhance the partnership of the public and private sectors in protecting our critical 
infrastructures and will provide reports to the President as appropriate. Senior Federal 
Government officials will participate in the meetings of the National Infrastructure 
Assurance Council as appropriate. 
 
VII. Protecting Federal Government Critical Infrastructures 
Every department and agency of the Federal Government shall be responsible for 
protecting its own critical infrastructure, especially its cyber-based systems. Every 
department and agency Chief Information Officer (CIO) shall be responsible for 
information assurance. Every department and agency shall appoint a Chief Infrastructure 
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Assurance Officer (CIAO) who shall be responsible for the protection of all of the other 
aspects of that department’s critical infrastructure. The CIO may be double-hatted as the 
CIAO at the discretion of the individual department. These officials shall establish 
procedures for obtaining expedient and valid authorizations to allow vulnerability 
assessments to be performed on government computer and physical systems. The 
Department of Justice shall establish legal guidelines for providing for such 
authorizations. 
No later than 180 days from issuance of this directive, every department and agency shall 
develop a plan for protecting its own critical infrastructure, including but not limited to 
its cyberbased systems. The National Coordinator shall be responsible for coordinating 
analyses required by the departments and agencies of inter-governmental dependencies 
and the mitigation of those dependencies. The Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group 
(CICG) shall sponsor an expert review process for those plans. No later than two years 
from today, those plans shall have been implemented and shall be updated every two 
years. In meeting this schedule, the Federal Government shall present a model to the 
private sector on how best to protect critical infrastructure. 
VIII. Tasks 
Within 180 days, the Principals Committee should submit to the President a schedule for 
completion of a National Infrastructure Assurance Plan with milestones for ccomplishing 
the following subordinate and related tasks. 
1.  Vulnerability Analyses: For each sector of the economy and each sector of the 
government that might be a target of infrastructure attack intended to significantly 
damage the United States, there shall be an initial vulnerability assessment, followed by 
periodic updates. As appropriate, these assessments shall also include the determination 
of the minimum essential infrastructure in each sector. 
2.  Remedial Plan: Based upon the vulnerability assessment, there shall be a 
recommended remedial plan. The plan shall identify timelines for implementation, 
responsibilities and funding. 
3.  Warning: A national center to warn of significant infrastructure attacks will be 
established immediately (see Annex A). As soon thereafter as possible, we will put in 
place an enhanced system for detecting and analyzing such attacks, with maximum 
possible participation of the private sector. 
4.  Response: A system for responding to a significant infrastructure attack while it is 
underway, with the goal of isolating and minimizing damage. 
5.  Reconstitution: For varying levels of successful infrastructure attacks, we shall 
have a system to reconstitute minimum required capabilities rapidly. 
6.  Education and Awareness: There shall be Vulnerability Awareness and Education 
Programs within both the government and the private sector to sensitize people regarding 
the importance of security and to train them in security standards, particularly regarding 
cyber systems. 
7.  Research and Development: Federally-sponsored research and development in 
support of infrastructure protection shall be coordinated, be subject to multi-year 
planning, take into account private sector research, and be adequately funded to minimize 
our vulnerabilities on a rapid but achievable timetable. 
8.  Intelligence: The Intelligence Community shall develop and implement a plan for 
enhancing collection and analysis of the foreign threat to our national infrastructure, to 
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include but not be limited to the foreign cyber/information warfare threat. 
9.  International Cooperation: There shall be a plan to expand cooperation on critical 
infrastructure protection with like-minded and friendly nations, international 
organizations and multinational corporations. 
10.  Legislative and Budgetary Requirements: There shall be an evaluation of the 
executive branch’s legislative authorities and budgetary priorities regarding critical 
infrastructure, and ameliorative recommendations shall be made to the President as 
necessary. The evaluations and recommendations, if any, shall be coordinated with the 




In addition to the 180-day report, the National Coordinator, working with the National 
Economic Council, shall provide an annual report on the implementation of this directive 
to the President and the heads of departments and agencies, through the Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs. The report should include an updated threat 
assessment, a status report on achieving the milestones identified for the National Plan 
and additional policy, legislative and budgetary recommendations. The evaluations and 
recommendations, if any, shall be coordinated with the Director of OMB. In addition, 
following the establishment of an initial operating capability in the year 2000, the 
National Coordinator shall conduct a zero-based review. 
Annex A: Structure and Organization 
Lead Agencies: Clear accountability within the U.S. Government must be designated for 
specific sectors and functions. The following assignments of responsibility will apply. 
Lead Agencies for Sector Liaison: 
Commerce    Information and communications 
Treasury    Banking and finance 
EPA     Water supply 
Transportation   Aviation 






Justice/FBI    Emergency law enforcement services 
FEMA    Emergency fire service 
Continuity of government services 
HHS  Public health services, including prevention, 
surveillance, laboratory services and personal health 
services 
Energy    Electric power 
Oil and gas production and storage 
Lead Agencies for Special Functions: 
Justice/FBI    Law enforcement and internal security 
CIA     Foreign intelligence 
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State     Foreign affairs 
Defense    National defense 
 
In addition, OSTP shall be responsible for coordinating research and development 
agendas and programs for the government through the National Science and Technology 
Council. Furthermore, while Commerce is the lead agency for information and 
communication, the Department of Defense will retain its Executive Agent 
responsibilities for the National Communications System and support of the President’s 
National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee.  
National Coordinator: The National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection 
and Counter-Terrorism shall be responsible for coordinating the implementation of this 
directive. The National Coordinator will report to the President through the Assistant to 
the President for National Security Affairs. The National Coordinator will also participate 
as a full member of Deputies or Principals Committee meetings when they meet to 
consider infrastructure issues. Although the National Coordinator will not direct 
Departments and Agencies, he or she will ensure inter-agency coordination for policy 
development and implementation, and will review crisis activities concerning 
infrastructure events with significant foreign involvement. The National Coordinator will 
provide advice, in the context of the established annual budget process, regarding agency 
budgets for critical infrastructure protection. The National Coordinator will chair the 
Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group (CICG), reporting to the Deputies Committee 
(or, at the call of its chair, the Principals Committee). The Sector Liaison Officials and 
Special Function Coordinators shall attend the CICG’s meetings. Departments and 
agencies shall each appoint to the CICG a senior official (Assistant Secretary level or 
higher) who will regularly attend its meetings. The National Security Advisor shall 
appoint a Senior Director for infrastructure Protection on the NSC staff. 
A National Plan Coordination (NPC) staff will be contributed on a non-reimbursable 
basis by the departments and agencies, consistent with law. The NPC staff will integrate 
the various sector plans into a National Infrastructure Assurance Plan and coordinate 
analyses of the U.S. Government’s own dependencies on critical infrastructures. The 
NPC staff will also help coordinate a national education and awareness program, and 
legislative and public affairs. 
The Defense Department shall continue to serve as Executive Agent for the Commission 
Transition Office, which will form the basis of the NPC, during the remainder of FY98. 
Beginning in FY99, the NPC shall be an office of the Commerce Department. The Office 
of Personnel Management shall provide the necessary assistance in facilitating the NPCs 
operations. The NPC will terminate at the end of FY01, unless extended by Presidential 
directive. 
Warning and Information Centers 
As part of a national warning and information sharing system, the President immediately 
authorizes the FBI to expand its current organization to a full scale National 
Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC). This organization shall serve as a national 
critical infrastructure threat assessment, warning, vulnerability, and law enforcement 
investigation and response entity. During the initial period of six to twelve months, the 
President also directs the National Coordinator and the Sector Liaison Officials, working 
together with the Sector Coordinators, the Special Function Coordinators and 
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representatives from the National Economic Council, as appropriate, to consult with 
owners and operators of the critical infrastructures to encourage the creation of a private 
sector sharing and analysis center, as described below. 
National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC): The NIPC will include FBI, USSS, and 
other investigators experienced in computer crimes and infrastructure protection, as well 
as representatives detailed from the Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community 
and Lead Agencies. It will be linked electronically to the rest of the Federal Government, 
including other warning and operations centers, as well as any private sector sharing and 
analysis centers. Its mission will include providing timely warnings of intentional threats, 
comprehensive analyses and law enforcement investigation and response. 
All executive departments and agencies shall cooperate with the NIPC and provide such 
assistance, information and advice that the NIPC may request, to the extent permitted by 
law. All executive departments shall also share with the NIPC information about threats 
and warning of attacks and about actual attacks on critical government and private sector 
infrastructures, to the extent permitted by law. The NIPC will include elements 
responsible for warning, analysis, computer investigation, coordinating emergency 
response, training, outreach and development and application of technical tools. In 
addition, it will establish its own relations directly with others in the private sector and 
with any information sharing and analysis entity that the private sector may create, such 
as the Information Sharing and Analysis Center described below.  
The NIPC, in conjunction with the information originating agency, will sanitize law 
enforcement and intelligence information for inclusion into analyses and reports that it 
will provide, in appropriate form, to relevant federal, state and local agencies; the 
relevant owners and operators of critical infrastructures; and to any private sector 
information sharing and analysis entity. 
Before disseminating national security or other information that originated from the 
intelligence community, the NIPC will coordinate fully with the intelligence community 
through existing procedures. Whether as sanitized or unsanitized reports, the NIPC will 
issue attack warnings or alerts to increases in threat condition to any private sector 
information sharing and analysis entity and to the owners and operators. These warnings 
may also include guidance regarding additional protection measures to be taken by 
owners and operators. Except in extreme emergencies, the NIPC shall coordinate with the 
National Coordinator before issuing public warnings of imminent attacks by international 
terrorists, foreign states or other malevolent foreign powers. 
The NIPC will provide a national focal point for gathering information on threats to the 
infrastructures. Additionally, the NIPC will provide the principal means of facilitating 
and coordinating the Federal Government’s response to an incident, mitigating attacks, 
investigating threats and monitoring reconstitution efforts. Depending on the nature and 
level of a foreign threat/attack, protocols established between special function agencies 
(DOJ/DOD/CIA), and the ultimate decision of the President, the NIPC may be placed in a 
direct support role to either DOD or the Intelligence Community. 
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC): The National Coordinator, working 
with Sector Coordinators, Sector Liaison Officials and the National Economic Council, 
shall consult with owners and operators of the critical infrastructures to strongly 
encourage the creation of a private sector information sharing and analysis center. The 
actual design and functions of the center and its relation to the NIPC will be determined 
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by the private sector, in consultation with and with assistance from the Federal 
Government. Within 180 days of this directive, the National Coordinator, with the 
assistance of the CICG including the National Economic Council, shall identify possible 
methods of providing federal assistance to facilitate the startup of an ISAC.  
Such a center could serve as the mechanism for gathering, analyzing, appropriately 
sanitizing and disseminating private sector information to both industry and the NIPC. 
The center could also gather, analyze and disseminate information from the NIPC for 
further distribution to the private sector. While crucial to a successful government-
industry partnership, this mechanism for sharing important information about 
vulnerabilities, threats, intrusions and anomalies is not to interfere with direct information 
exchanges between companies and the government. 
As ultimately designed by private sector representatives, the ISAC may emulate 
particular aspects of such institutions as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
that have proved highly effective, particularly its extensive interchanges with the private 
and non-federal sectors. Under such a model, the ISAC would possess a large degree of 
technical focus and expertise and non-regulatory and non-law enforcement missions. It 
would establish baseline statistics and patterns on the various infrastructures, become a 
clearinghouse for information within and among the various sectors, and provide a library 
for historical data to be used by the private sector and, as deemed appropriate by the 
ISAC, by the government. Critical to the success of such an institution would be its 
timeliness, accessibility, coordination, flexibility, utility and acceptability. 
Annex B: Additional Taskings Studies 
The National Coordinator shall commission studies on the following subjects: 
· Liability issues arising from participation by private sector companies in the 
information sharing process. 
· Existing legal impediments to information sharing, with an eye to proposals to remove 
these impediments, including through the drafting of model codes in cooperation with the 
American Legal Institute. 
· The necessity of document and information classification and the impact of such 
classification on useful dissemination, as well as the methods and information systems by 
which threat and vulnerability information can be shared securely while avoiding 
disclosure or unacceptable risk of disclosure to those who will misuse it. 
· The improved protection, including secure dissemination and information handling 
systems, of industry trade secrets and other confidential business data, law enforcement 
information and evidentiary material, classified national security information, 
unclassified material disclosing vulnerabilities of privately owned infrastructures and 
apparently innocuous information that, in the aggregate, it is unwise to disclose. 
· The implications of sharing information with foreign entities where such sharing is 
deemed necessary to the security of United States infrastructures. 
· The potential benefit to security standards of mandating, subsidizing, or otherwise 
assisting in the provision of insurance for selected critical infrastructure providers and 
requiring insurance tie-ins for foreign critical infrastructure providers hoping to do 
business with the United States. 
Public Outreach 
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In order to foster a climate of enhanced public sensitivity to the problem of infrastructure 
protection, the following actions shall be taken: 
· The White House, under the oversight of the National Coordinator, together with the 
relevant Cabinet agencies shall consider a series of conferences: (1) that will bring 
together national leaders in the public and private sectors to propose programs to increase 
the commitment to information security; (2) that convoke academic leaders from 
engineering, computer science, business and law schools to review the status of education 
in information security and will identify changes in the curricula and resources necessary 
to meet the national demand for professionals in this field; (3) on the issues around 
computer ethics as these relate to the K through 12 and general university populations. 
· The National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering shall 
consider a round table bringing together federal, state and local officials with industry 
and academic leaders to develop national strategies for enhancing infrastructure security. 
· The intelligence community and law enforcement shall expand existing programs for 
briefing infrastructure owners and operators and senior government officials. 
· The National Coordinator shall (1) establish a program for infrastructure assurance 
simulations involving senior public and private officials, the reports of which might be 
distributed as part of an awareness campaign; and (2) in coordination with the private 
sector, launch a continuing national awareness campaign, emphasizing improving 
infrastructure security. 
Internal Federal Government Actions 
In order for the Federal Government to improve its infrastructure security, these 
immediate steps shall be taken: 
· The Department of Commerce, the General Services Administration, and the 
Department of Defense shall assist federal agencies in the implementation of best 
practices for information assurance within their individual agencies. 
· The National Coordinator shall coordinate a review of existing federal, state and local 
bodies charged with information assurance tasks, and provide recommendations on how 
these institutions can cooperate most effectively. 
· All federal agencies shall make clear designations regarding who may authorize access 
to their computer systems. 
· The Intelligence Community shall elevate and formalize the priority for enhanced 
collection and analysis of information on the foreign cyber/information warfare threat to 
our critical infrastructure. 
· The Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Service and other appropriate agencies 
shall: (1) vigorously recruit undergraduate and graduate students with the relevant 
computer-related technical skills for full-time employment as well as for part-time work 
with regional computer crime squads; and (2) facilitate the hiring and retention of 
qualified personnel for technical analysis and investigation involving cyber attacks. 
· The Department of Transportation, in consultation with the Department of Defense, 
shall undertake a thorough evaluation of the vulnerability of the national transportation 
infrastructure that relies on the Global Positioning System. This evaluation shall include 
sponsoring an independent, integrated assessment of risks to civilian users of GPS-based 
93 
systems, with a view to basing decisions on the ultimate architecture of the modernized 
NAS on these evaluations. 
· The Federal Aviation Administration shall develop and implement a comprehensive 
National Airspace System Security Program to protect the modernized NAS from 
information-based and other disruptions and attacks. 
· GSA shall identify large procurements (such as the new Federal Telecommunications 
System, FTS 2000) related to infrastructure assurance, study whether the procurement 
process reflects the importance of infrastructure protection and propose, if necessary, 
revisions to the overall procurement process to do so. 
· OMB shall direct federal agencies to include assigned infrastructure assurance 
functions within their Government Performance and Results Act strategic planning and 
performance measurement framework. 
· The NSA, in accordance with its National Manager responsibilities in NSD-42, shall 
provide assessments encompassing examinations of U.S. Government systems to 
interception and exploitation; disseminate threat and vulnerability information; establish 
standards; conduct research and development; and conduct issue security product 
evaluations. 
Assisting the Private Sector 
In order to assist the private sector in achieving and maintaining infrastructure security: 
· The National Coordinator and the National Infrastructure Assurance Council shall 
propose and develop ways to encourage private industry to perform periodic risk 
assessments of critical processes, including information and telecommunications systems. 
· The Department of Commerce and the Department of Defense shall work together, in 
coordination with the private sector, to offer their expertise to private owners and 
operators of critical infrastructure to develop security-related best practice standards. 
· The Department of Justice and Department of the Treasury shall sponsor a 
comprehensive study compiling demographics of computer crime, comparing state 
approaches to computer crime and developing ways of deterring and responding to 
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APPENDIX G: PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE 68 
(INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC INFORMATION) 
International Public Information 
Presidential Decision Directive 68 
30 April 1999 
 
No text or factsheet for this PDD has been released (the PDD is classified). This 
summary was developed from open-source information. 
On 30 April 1999 President Clinton issued a secret Presidential Decision Direction—
PDD 68 -- ordering the creation of an International Public Information (IPI) to address 
problems identified during military missions in Kosovo and Haiti, when no single US 
agency was empowered to coordinate US efforts to sell its policies and counteract bad 
press abroad. The IPI system is geared towards prevention and mitigation of crises and 
operate on a continuous basis. PDD-68 is evidently intended to replace the provisions of 
NSDD 77 “Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security” issued by 
President Reagan on 14 February 1983.  
PDD 68 ordered top officials from the Defense, State, Justice, Commerce and Treasury 
departments and the Central Intelligence Agency and FBI to establish an IPI Core Group. 
The IPI Core Group is chaired by the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public 
Affairs at the State Department. The IPI Core Group is ordered by the Presidential 
Directive to “assist [U.S. government] efforts in defeating adversaries.” “The intelligence 
community will play a crucial role . . . for identifying hostile foreign propaganda and 
deception that targets the U.S.,” the Group’s charter says. The IPI Core Group will 
arrange “training exercises at the National Defense University, National Foreign Affairs 
Training Center, the Service War Colleges” and other institutions.  
The International Public Information [IPI] System is designed to “influence foreign 
audiences” in support of US foreign policy and to counteract propaganda by enemies of 
the United States. The intent is “to enhance U.S. security, bolster America’s economic 
prosperity and to promote democracy abroad,” according to the IPI Core Group Charter. 
The Group’s charter states that IPI control over “international military information” is 
intended to “influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning and ultimately the 
behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups and individuals.” The IPIG will 
encourage the United Nations and other international organizations to make “effective 
use of IPI . . . in support of multilateral peacekeeping.” According to the IPIG Chater, IPI 
activities “are overt and address foreign audiences only” while domestic information 
should be “deconflicted” and “synchronized” to avoid contradictory messages.  
Previously, the US Information Agency and the State Department were the primary 
agencies with responsibility for international public diplomacy. But with the information 
revolution, all agencies now have the ability to communicate internationally and interact 
with foreign populations. IPI is a mechanism that has been established to make sure that 
these various actors are working in a coordinated manner. According to the IPIG Charter, 
“The objective of IPI is to synchronize the informational objectives, themes and 
messages that will be projected overseas . . . to prevent and mitigate crises and to 
influence foreign audiences in ways favorable to the achievement of U.S. foreign policy 
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objectives.” The charter insists that information distributed through IPI should be 
designed not “to mislead foreign audiences” and that information programs “must be 
truthful.”  
The new information policy will not be used to influence the American public, which is 
prohibited by U.S. law. However, since foreign media reports are frequently reflected in 
American news media, it will be impossible to entirely preclude a backwash of the IPI-
generated information into America. The IPIG Charter recognizes this, calling for the US 
Government domestic public affairs activities to be coordinated with foreign IPI efforts. 
According to the IPIG Charter, information aimed at domestic audiences should “be 
coordinated, integrated, deconflicted and synchronized with the [IPI Core Group] to 
achieve a synergistic effect for [government] strategic information activities.”  
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APPENDIX H: EXECUTIVE ORDER ON CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE INFORMATION AGE 
THE WHITE HOUSE 
Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age 
16 October 2001 
 
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United 
States of America, and in order to ensure protection of information systems for critical 
infrastructure, including emergency preparedness communications, and the physical 
assets that support such systems, in the information age, it is hereby ordered as follows:  
Section 1. Policy.  
(a) The information technology revolution has changed the way business is transacted, 
government operates, and national defense is conducted. Those three functions now 
depend on an interdependent network of critical information infrastructures. The 
protection program authorized by this order shall consist of continuous efforts to secure 
information systems for critical infrastructure, including emergency preparedness 
communications, and the physical assets that support such systems. Protection of these 
systems is essential to the telecommunications, energy, financial services, manufacturing, 
water, transportation, health care, and emergency services sectors.  
(b) It is the policy of the United States to protect against disruption of the operation of 
information systems for critical infrastructure and thereby help to protect the people, 
economy, essential human and government services, and national security of the United 
States, and to ensure that any disruptions that occur are infrequent, of minimal duration, 
and manageable, and cause the least damage possible. The implementation of this policy 
shall include a voluntary public-private partnership, involving corporate and 
nongovernmental organizations.  
 
Section 2. Scope.  
To achieve this policy, there shall be a senior executive branch board to coordinate and 
have cognizance of Federal efforts and programs that relate to protection of information 
systems and involve:  
(a) cooperation with and protection of private sector critical infrastructure, State and local 
governments, critical infrastructure, and supporting programs in corporate and academic 
organizations;  
(b) protection of Federal departments and agencies, critical infrastructure; and © related 
national security programs.  
 
Section 3. Establishment.  
I hereby establish the “President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board” (the 
“Board”).  
 
Section 4. Continuing Authorities.  
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This order does not alter the existing authorities or roles of United States Government 
departments and agencies. Authorities set forth in 44 U.S.C. Chapter 35, and other 
applicable law, provide senior officials with responsibility for the security of Federal 
Government information systems.  
(a) Executive Branch Information Systems Security. The Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) has the responsibility to develop and oversee the 
implementation of government-wide policies, principles, standards, and guidelines for the 
security of information systems that support the executive branch departments and 
agencies, except those noted in section 4(b) of this order. The Director of OMB shall 
advise the President and the appropriate department or agency head when there is a 
critical deficiency in the security practices within the purview of this section in an 
executive branch department or agency. The Board shall assist and support the Director 
of OMB in this function and shall be reasonably cognizant of programs related to security 
of department and agency information systems.  
(b) National Security Information Systems. The Secretary of Defense and the Director of 
Central Intelligence (DCI) shall have responsibility to oversee, develop, and ensure 
implementation of policies, principles, standards, and guidelines for the security of 
information systems that support the operations under their respective control. In 
consultation with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the 
affected departments and agencies, the Secretary of Defense and the DCI shall develop 
policies, principles, standards, and guidelines for the security of national security 
information systems that support the operations of other executive branch departments 
and agencies with national security information. Policies, principles, standards, and 
guidelines developed under this subsection may require more stringent protection than 
those developed in accordance with subsection 4(a) of this order. The Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs shall advise the President and the appropriate 
department or agency head when there is a critical deficiency in the security practices of 
a department or agency within the purview of this section. The Board, or one of its 
standing or ad hoc committees, shall be reasonably cognizant of programs to provide 
security and continuity to national security information systems.  
© Additional Responsibilities: The Heads of Executive Branch Departments and 
Agencies. The heads of executive branch departments and agencies are responsible and 
accountable for providing and maintaining adequate levels of security for information 
systems, including emergency preparedness communications systems, for programs 
under their control. Heads of such departments and agencies shall ensure the 
development and, within available appropriations, funding of programs that adequately 
address these mission areas. Cost-effective security shall be built into and made an 
integral part of government information systems, especially those critical systems that 
support the national security and other essential government programs. Additionally, 
security should enable, and not unnecessarily impede, department and agency business 
operations.  
Section 5. Board Responsibilities.  
Consistent with the responsibilities noted in section 4 of this order, the Board shall 
recommend policies and coordinate programs for protecting information systems for 
critical infrastructure, including emergency preparedness communications, and the 
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physical assets that support such systems. Among its activities to implement these 
responsibilities, the Board shall:  
(a) Outreach to the Private Sector and State and Local Governments. In consultation with 
affected executive branch departments and agencies, coordinate outreach to and 
consultation with the private sector, including corporations that own, operate, develop, 
and equip information, telecommunications, transportation, energy, water, health care, 
and financial services, on protection of information systems for critical infrastructure, 
including emergency preparedness communications, and the physical assets that support 
such systems; and coordinate outreach to State and local governments, as well as 
communities and representatives from academia and other relevant elements of society.  
When requested to do so, assist in the development of voluntary standards and best 
practices in a manner consistent with 15 U.S.C. Chapter 7; Consult with potentially 
affected communities, including the legal, auditing, financial, and insurance 
communities, to the extent permitted by law, to determine areas of mutual concern; and  
Coordinate the activities of senior liaison officers appointed by the Attorney General, the 
Secretaries of Energy, Commerce, Transportation, the Treasury, and Health and Human 
Services, and the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency for outreach 
on critical infrastructure protection issues with private sector organizations within the 
areas of concern to these departments and agencies. In these and other related functions, 
the Board shall work in coordination with the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office 
(CIAO) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology of the Department of 
Commerce, the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), and the National 
Communications System (NCS).  
(b) Information Sharing. Work with industry, State and local governments, and 
nongovernmental organizations to ensure that systems are created and well managed to 
share threat warning, analysis, and recovery information among government network 
operation centers, information sharing and analysis centers established on a voluntary 
basis by industry, and other related operations centers. In this and other related functions, 
the Board shall work in coordination with the NCS, the Federal Computer Incident 
Response Center, the NIPC, and other departments and agencies, as appropriate.  
© Incident Coordination and Crisis Response. Coordinate programs and policies for 
responding to information systems security incidents that threaten information systems 
for critical infrastructure, including emergency preparedness communications, and the 
physical assets that support such systems. In this function, the Department of Justice, 
through the NIPC and the Manager of the NCS and other departments and agencies, as 
appropriate, shall work in coordination with the Board.  
(d) Recruitment, Retention, and Training Executive Branch Security Professionals. In 
consultation with executive branch departments and agencies, coordinate programs to 
ensure that government employees with responsibilities for protecting information 
systems for critical infrastructure, including emergency preparedness communications, 
and the physical assets that support such systems, are adequately trained and evaluated. 
In this function, the Office of Personnel Management shall work in coordination with the 
Board, as appropriate.  
(e) Research and Development. Coordinate with the Director of the Office of Science and 
Technology Policy (OSTP) on a program of Federal Government research and 
development for protection of information systems for critical infrastructure, including 
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emergency preparedness communications, and the physical assets that support such 
systems, and ensure coordination of government activities in this field with corporations, 
universities, Federally funded research centers, and national laboratories. In this function, 
the Board shall work in coordination with the National Science Foundation, the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency, and with other departments and agencies, as 
appropriate.  
(f) Law Enforcement Coordination with National Security Components. Promote 
programs against cyber crime and assist Federal law enforcement agencies in gaining 
necessary cooperation from executive branch departments and agencies. Support Federal 
law enforcement agencies investigation of illegal activities involving information systems 
for critical infrastructure, including emergency preparedness communications, and the 
physical assets that support such systems, and support coordination by these agencies 
with other departments and agencies with responsibilities to defend the Nation’s security. 
In this function, the Board shall work in coordination with the Department of Justice, 
through the NIPC, and the Department of the Treasury, through the Secret Service, and 
with other departments and agencies, as appropriate.  
(g) International Information Infrastructure Protection. Support the Department of 
State’s coordination of United States Government programs for international cooperation 
covering international information infrastructure protection issues.  
(h) Legislation. In accordance with OMB circular A-19, advise departments and agencies, 
the Director of OMB, and the Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs on 
legislation relating to protection of information systems for critical infrastructure, 
including emergency preparedness communications, and the physical assets that support 
such systems.  
(i) Coordination with Office of Homeland Security. Carry out those functions relating to 
protection of and recovery from attacks against information systems for critical 
infrastructure, including emergency preparedness communications, that were assigned to 
the Office of Homeland Security by Executive Order 13228 of October 8, 2001. The 
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, in coordination with the Assistant to 
the President for National Security Affairs, shall be responsible for defining the 
responsibilities of the Board in coordinating efforts to protect physical assets that support 
information systems.  
 
Section 6. Membership.  
(a) Members of the Board shall be drawn from the executive branch departments, 
agencies, and offices listed below; in addition, concerned Federal departments and 
agencies may participate in the activities of appropriate committees of the Board. The 
Board shall be led by a Chair and Vice Chair, designated by the President. Its other 
members shall be the following senior officials or their designees:  
Secretary of State;  
Secretary of the Treasury;  
Secretary of Defense;  
Attorney General;  
Secretary of Commerce;  
Secretary of Health and Human Services;  
Secretary of Transportation;  
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Secretary of Energy;  
Director of Central Intelligence;  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;  
Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency;  
Administrator of General Services;  
Director of the Office of Management and Budget;  
Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy;  
Chief of Staff to the Vice President;  
Director of the National Economic Council;  
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs;  
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security;  
Chief of Staff to the President; and  
Such other executive branch officials as the President may designate. 
Members of the Board and their designees shall be full-time or permanent part-time 
officers or employees of the Federal Government.  
(b) In addition, the following officials shall serve as members of the Board and shall form 
the Board’s Coordination Committee:  
Director, Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, Department of Commerce;  
Manager, National Communications System;  
Vice Chair, Chief Information Officers (CIO) Council;  
Information Assurance Director, National Security Agency;  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management; and  
Director, National Infrastructure Protection Center, FBI, Department of Justice. 
© The Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission may appoint a 
representative to the Board.  
Section 7. Chair.  
(a) The Chair also shall be the Special Advisor to the President for Cyberspace Security. 
Executive branch departments and agencies shall make all reasonable efforts to keep the 
Chair fully informed in a timely manner, and to the greatest extent permitted by law, of 
all programs and issues within the purview of the Board. The Chair, in consultation with 
the Board, shall call and preside at meetings of the Board and set the agenda for the 
Board. The Chair, in consultation with the Board, may propose policies and programs to 
appropriate officials to ensure the protection of the Nation’s information systems for 
critical infrastructure, including emergency preparedness communications, and the 
physical assets that support such systems. To ensure full coordination between the 
responsibilities of the National Security Council (NSC) and the Office of Homeland 
Security, the Chair shall report to both the Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs and to the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. The Chair shall 
coordinate with the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy on issues relating to 
private sector systems and economic effects and with the Director of OMB on issues 
relating to budgets and the security of computer networks addressed in subsection 4(a) of 
this order.  
(b) The Chair shall be assisted by an appropriately sized staff within the White House 
Office. In addition, heads of executive branch departments and agencies are authorized, 
to the extent permitted by law, to detail or assign personnel of such departments and 
agencies to the Board’s staff upon request of the Chair, subject to the approval of the 
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Chief of Staff to the President. Members of the Board’s staff with responsibilities relating 
to national security information systems, communications, and information warfare may, 
with respect to those responsibilities, also work at the direction of the Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs.  
 
Section 8. Standing Committees.  
(a) The Board may establish standing and ad hoc committees as appropriate. 
Representation on standing committees shall not be limited to those departments and 
agencies on the Board, but may include representatives of other concerned executive 
branch departments and agencies.  
(b) Chairs of standing and ad hoc committees shall report fully and regularly on the 
activities of the committees to the Board, which shall ensure that the committees are well 
coordinated with each other.  
© There are established the following standing committees:  
Private Sector and State and Local Government Outreach, chaired by the designee of the 
Secretary of Commerce, to work in coordination with the designee of the Chairman of the 
National Economic Council.  
Executive Branch Information Systems Security, chaired by the designee of the Director 
of OMB. The committee shall assist OMB in fulfilling its responsibilities under 44 
U.S.C. Chapter 35 and other applicable law.  
National Security Systems. The National Security Telecommunications and Information 
Systems Security Committee, as established by and consistent with NSD-42 and chaired 
by the Department of Defense, shall serve as a Board standing committee, and be 
redesignated the Committee on National Security Systems.  
Incident Response Coordination, co-chaired by the designees of the Attorney General and 
the Secretary of Defense.  
Research and Development, chaired by a designee of the Director of OSTP.  
National Security and Emergency Preparedness Communications. The NCS Committee 
of Principals is renamed the Board’s Committee for National Security and Emergency 
Preparedness Communications. The reporting functions established above for standing 
committees are in addition to the functions set forth in Executive Order 12472 of April 3, 
1984, and do not alter any function or role set forth therein.  
Physical Security, co-chaired by the designees of the Secretary of Defense and the 
Attorney General, to coordinate programs to ensure the physical security of information 
systems for critical infrastructure, including emergency preparedness communications, 
and the physical assets that support such systems. The standing committee shall 
coordinate its work with the Office of Homeland Security and shall work closely with the 
Physical Security Working Group of the Records Access and Information Security Policy 
Coordinating Committee to ensure coordination of efforts.  
Infrastructure Interdependencies, co-chaired by the designees of the Secretaries of 
Transportation and Energy, to coordinate programs to assess the unique risks, threats, and 
vulnerabilities associated with the interdependency of information systems for critical 
infrastructures, including the development of effective models, simulations, and other 
analytic tools and cost-effective technologies in this area.  
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International Affairs, chaired by a designee of the Secretary of State, to support 
Department of State coordination of United States Government programs for 
international cooperation covering international information infrastructure issues.  
Financial and Banking Information Infrastructure, chaired by a designee of the Secretary 
of the Treasury and including representatives of the banking and financial institution 
regulatory agencies.  
Other Committees. Such other standing committees as may be established by the Board.  
(d) Subcommittees. The chair of each standing committee may form necessary 
subcommittees with organizational representation as determined by the Chair.  
(e) Streamlining. The Board shall develop procedures that specify the manner in which it 
or a subordinate committee will perform the responsibilities previously assigned to the 
Policy Coordinating Committee. The Board, in coordination with the Director of OSTP, 
shall review the functions of the Joint Telecommunications Resources Board, established 
under Executive Order 12472, and make recommendations about its future role.  
 
Section 9. Planning and Budget.  
(a) The Board, on a periodic basis, shall propose a National Plan or plans for subjects 
within its purview. The Board, in coordination with the Office of Homeland Security, 
also shall make recommendations to OMB on those portions of executive branch 
department and agency budgets that fall within the Board’s purview, after review of 
relevant program requirements and resources. (b) The Office of Administration within the 
Executive Office of the President shall provide the Board with such personnel, funding, 
and administrative support, to the extent permitted by law and subject to the availability 
of appropriations, as directed by the Chief of Staff to carry out the provisions of this 
order. Only those funds that are available for the Office of Homeland Security, 
established by Executive Order 13228, shall be available for such purposes. -To the 
extent permitted by law and as appropriate, agencies represented on the Board also may 
provide administrative support for the Board. The National Security Agency shall ensure 
that the Board’s information and communications systems are appropriately secured. (c) 
The Board may annually request the National Science Foundation, Department of 
Energy, Department of Transportation, Environmental Protection Agency, Department of 
Commerce, Department of Defense, and the Intelligence Community, as that term is 
defined in Executive Order 12333 of December 4, 1981, to include in their budget 
requests to OMB funding for demonstration projects and research to support the Board’s 
activities.  
 
Section 10. Presidential Advisory Panels.  
The Chair shall work closely with panels of senior experts from outside of the 
government that advise the President, in particular: the President’s National Security 
Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) created by Executive Order 12382 
of September 13, 1982, as amended, and the National Infrastructure Advisory Council 
(NIAC or Council) created by this Executive Order. The Chair and Vice Chair of these 
two panels also may meet with the Board, as appropriate and to the extent permitted by 
law, to provide a private sector perspective.  
(a) NSTAC. The NSTAC provides the President advice on the security and continuity of 
communications systems essential for national security and emergency preparedness.  
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(b) NIAC. There is hereby established the National Infrastructure Advisory Council, 
which shall provide the President advice on the security of information systems for 
critical infrastructure supporting other sectors of the economy: banking and finance, 
transportation, energy, manufacturing, and emergency government services. The NIAC 
shall be composed of not more than 30 members appointed by the President. The 
members of the NIAC shall be selected from the private sector, academia, and State and 
local government. Members of the NIAC shall have expertise relevant to the functions of 
the NIAC and generally shall be selected from industry Chief Executive Officers (and 
equivalently ranked leaders in other organizations) with responsibilities for the security 
of information infrastructure supporting the critical sectors of the economy, including 
banking and finance, transportation, energy, communications, and emergency 
government services. Members shall not be full-time officials or employees of the 
executive branch of the Federal Government.  
The President shall designate a Chair and Vice Chair from among the members of the 
NIAC. The Chair of the Board established by this order will serve as the Executive 
Director of the NIAC.  
© NIAC Functions. The NIAC will meet periodically to:  
· enhance the partnership of the public and private sectors in protecting information 
systems for critical infrastructures and provide reports on this issue to the 
President, as appropriate;  
· propose and develop ways to encourage private industry to perform periodic risk 
assessments of critical information and telecommunications systems;  
· monitor the development of private sector Information Sharing and Analysis 
Centers (ISACs) and provide recommendations to the Board on how these 
organizations can best foster improved cooperation among the ISACs, the NIPC, 
and other Federal Government entities;  
· report to the President through the Board, which shall ensure appropriate 
coordination with the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy under the 
terms of this order; and  
· advise lead agencies with critical infrastructure responsibilities, sector 
coordinators, the NIPC, the ISACs, and the Board.  
(d) Administration of the NIAC.  
· The NIAC may hold hearings, conduct inquiries, and establish subcommittees, as 
appropriate.  
· Upon the request of the Chair, and to the extent permitted by law, the heads of the 
executive branch departments and agencies shall provide the Council with 
information and advice relating to its functions.  
· Senior Federal Government officials may participate in the meetings of the NIAC, 
as appropriate.  
· Members shall serve without compensation for their work on the Council. 
However, members may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of 
subsistence, as authorized by law for persons serving intermittently in Federal 
Government service (5 U.S.C. 5701-5707).  
· To the extent permitted by law, and subject to the availability of appropriations, 
the Department of Commerce, through the CIAO, shall provide the NIAC with 
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administrative services, staff, and other support services and such funds as may be 
necessary for the performance of the NIAC’s functions.  
(e) General Provisions.  
· Insofar as the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. App.), may 
apply to the NIAC, the functions of the President under that Act, except that of 
reporting to the Congress, shall be performed by the Department of Commerce in 
accordance with the guidelines and procedures established by the Administrator 
of General Services.  
· The Council shall terminate 2 years from the date of this order, unless extended 
by the President prior to that date.  
· Executive Order 13130 of July 14, 1999, is hereby revoked.  
 
Section 11. National Communications System.  
Changes in technology are causing the convergence of much of telephony, data relay, and 
internet communications networks into an interconnected network of networks. The NCS 
and its National Coordinating Center shall support use of telephony, converged 
information, voice networks, and next generation networks for emergency preparedness 
and national security communications functions assigned to them in Executive Order 
12472. All authorities and assignments of responsibilities to departments and agencies in 
that order, including the role of the Manager of NCS, remain unchanged except as 
explicitly modified by this order.  
Section 12. Counter-intelligence.  
The Board shall coordinate its activities with those of the Office of the 
Counterintelligence Executive to address the threat to programs within the Board’s 
purview from hostile foreign intelligence services.  
Section 13. Classification Authority.  
I hereby delegate to the Chair the authority to classify information originally as Top 
Secret, in accordance with Executive Order 12958 of April 17, 1995, as amended, or any 
successor Executive Order.  
Section 14. General Provisions.  
(a) Nothing in this order shall supersede any requirement made by or under law.  
(b) This order does not create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable 
at law or equity, against the United States, its departments, agencies or other entities, its 
officers or employees, or any other person.  
 
George W. Bush 
THE WHITE HOUSE 
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